Conflict Dynamics in the Mano River Region and Cote d'Ivoire : A Contextual Analysis by Waldman, Tom
 1 
1
 
 
 
Thomas Waldman 
Independent Voluntary Researcher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conflict Dynamics in The Mano River 
Region and Cote d’Ivoire: 
A Contextual Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oxfam GB 
Dakar Regional Office 
November 2005
 2 
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 4 
The Global Context and New Wars .................................................................................................... 4 
Objectives ........................................................................................................................................... 5 
Structure of the Report ........................................................................................................................ 5 
Section One – Regional Aspects of Conflict ............................................................... 7 
Part One - The Regionalisation of Conflict......................................................................................... 7 
Porous Borders ........................................................................................................................... 7 
Case Study of Conflict Regionalisation ....................................................................................... 8 
Part Two - Region-wide Characteristics of Conflict ........................................................................... 9 
The Character and Actions of Armed Groups ............................................................................. 9 
International Involvement and Aid  ........................................................................................... 13 
The War Economy ..................................................................................................................... 15 
Section Two – Conflict Dynamics Overview ........................................................... 20 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 20 
Primary Causes and Beginnings ....................................................................................................... 20 
Early Conflict Development ............................................................................................................. 21 
Conflict Intensification ..................................................................................................................... 23 
Conflict Perpetuation and Renewal – „The Conflict Trap‟  .............................................................. 24 
Conflict Resolution and Potential for Relapse  ................................................................................. 25 
Prospects for the Region ................................................................................................................... 27 
Section Three – Country Specific Backgrounders .................................................. 30 
Liberia ............................................................................................................................................... 30 
Sierra Leone ...................................................................................................................................... 34 
Guinea ............................................................................................................................................... 38 
Côte d‟Ivoire ..................................................................................................................................... 42 
Annex I – Map of the Region .................................................................................... 46 
Annex II - Thematic Bibliography ........................................................................... 47 
Annex III - Liberia Field Visit Report ..................................................................... 51 
Annex IV – Conflict Chart ........................................................................................ 57
 3 
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 4 
4
Introduction 
 
 
The Global Context and New Wars 
 
The end of the Cold War in 1989 marked a significant transformation in the global political 
system.   The end of the ideological superpower confrontation represented the onset of a 
new era of uncertainty for the future of global security.  The peripheral wars fought 
throughout the Cold War were almost all shaped in some way by the bipolar system and 
"the fear that escalation could eventually reach the nuclear level inhibited any direct 
combat whatsoever by the superpowers themselves."  Once the Cold War structure was 
removed "established patterns vanished" and subsequent conflicts were no longer 
contained or managed by superpower overseers.  Wars of proxy were replaced with new 
forms of "nonstructured or destructured conflict" (Shawcross 2000).       
Most academic commentators on post Cold War conflict recognise that the 1990s 
witnessed the emergence of a new form of warfare.  The names they designate these new 
forms of conflict range from the "new wars" of Mary Kaldor, the "post-heroic warfare" of 
Edward Luttwak to Michael Ignatieff's "ethnic" wars (Kaldor 1999; Luttwak 1995; 
Ignatieff 1998).  New wars were conceived as such not simply for their changed nature but 
also for the international reaction they provoked as organisations, such as NATO, struggled 
to determine their role in the post-Cold War environment.  „Humanitarianism‟ – in its 
broadest sense - became the prevailing fashion of the international community and the 
extremely mixed record of engagement it engendered has provoked perennial debates as to 
the efficacy of attempting to douse the flames of new wars raging on the periphery.  
Indeed, it could be argued that the humanitarian impulse has done as much to shape the 
character of new wars as any other factor.   
It should be noted however, that the end of the Cold War alone cannot fully explain 
the emergence and proliferation of these new wars.  A number of important processes that 
have fed into their development can be identified, predating 1989, which have been 
gradually transforming and moulding the contours of modern warfare.  As Kaldor stresses, 
the most important of these is the process of globalisation, or as she defines it, "the 
intensification of global interconnectedness - political, economic, military and cultural," 
(Kaldor 1999) which has undoubtedly impacted upon the nature of warfare.  The central 
paradox of globalisation is that it at once shortens the distances between peoples across the 
globe yet, simultaneously, can serve to intensify individualism, localism and the social 
isolation of those who feel excluded from its benefits.  Thus, it is more correctly a process 
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of globalisation and fragmentation.  Also, other processes closely related to globalisation 
continue to alter the nature of war: the increased privatisation of military affairs, the 
expanding market in small arms, and the rapid advances made in science and technology. 
The wars witnessed in the Mano River region over the last two decades are 
undoubtedly best understood within the framework of these new wars.  Yet, equally, we 
must be aware that deeply embedded historical and cultural factors, specific to the region, 
influence and play into the causes and development of conflict.  The convergence of these 
two broad factors (the changing nature of modern warfare and the continued importance of 
history) has created wars characterised by their complexity and brutality.  It has caused a 
cacophony of protagonists to be present in the battle-space at any one time, such as rebel 
warlords, child soldiers, foreign mercenaries, peacekeepers and humanitarian personnel. 
The distinctions between war and peace, soldier and civilian, friend and foe, war-fighting 
and criminality, right and wrong, have become blurred and imprecise.  Civilians have 
become the primary victims as ethnic difference and mistrust become instruments for 
military leaders. Established rules or laws governing the waging of war developed over 
centuries (today enshrined in the Geneva Conventions) become almost meaningless where 
many combatants are children with little knowledge of such formalities.  For some, war 
becomes a source of protection, profit and power, for others it brings exclusion, misery and 
loss.  All this occurs in an environment typified by state collapse and the breakdown of law 
and order. 
This pervasive complexity makes international involvement in the region much 
more difficult when the distinctions between victim and perpetrator is so hard to determine 
and when their very presence becomes an important, yet uncertain, element of conflict.  
This doesn‟t mean the international community should shy away from engagement, but 
instead compels them to understand more fully the dynamics of conflict and how their 
involvement can be most effectively applied.  Making sense of such senseless conflict is 
indeed difficult, but if we are to attempt to effectively lessen the suffering inflicted on 
ordinary people in future wars, we must attempt to find the sense within the ostensible 
senselessness.  
 
Objectives 
 
This report is primarily intended to draw together a considerable body of literature on 
conflict in the Mano River region and Cote d‟Ivoire into a clear and concise document to 
serve as a source of information on broad conflict characteristics and dynamics and 
historical context for Oxfam personnel operating in those countries.  It is designed to 
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encourage further thinking and engagement with the topics.  It is written by an independent 
researcher from outside Oxfam and as such does not offer programme-oriented 
recommendations for staff; rather it is intended to inform and feed into Oxfam 
programming in an indirect sense.  Nor is the purpose of this report to present a manual for 
post-conflict reconstruction - such issues have been clearly documented and the basic 
theoretical tenets are widely known.  Instead the aim is to provide a historical context of 
the region‟s conflicts whilst also drawing out key themes and issues that have fed into the 
conflict and contributed to the destabilisation of the region.   
This, it is hoped, will enable informed regional initiatives and programmes that are 
sensitive to important conflict causes and dynamics.  As will be shown, the region is 
fraught with complexities, and events in one area can impact far and wide.  It is vital that 
Oxfam personnel conducting work in the area have at least a basic understanding of wider 
issues relating to conflict that may not ostensibly relate to Oxfam programmes.  This 
imperative is summarised by Sarah Collinson, from the Overseas Development Institute 
(ODI), as follows: 
 
“Effective policies and principled approaches can only emerge from an adequate 
understanding of the situation that one wishes to ameliorate…humanitarian action 
must be about more than technical issues of logistics or good practice” (Collinson, 
2003) 
 
This report has been researched and written in the context of a potentially unstable 
period for the region: the first round of elections have taken place in Liberia; Cote 
d‟Ivoire‟s elections have been postponed amidst political impasse; political change is on 
the horizon in Guinea given the ill-health of president Conte; and Sierra Leone‟s gradual 
progress depends significantly upon continued stability in neighbouring countries.  It is not 
an overstatement to suggest that, in the coming months, the future of the region hangs in 
the balance, therefore informed engagement is an imperative. 
 
Structure of the Report 
 
This report is divided into three sections.  Section One analyses the regional aspects of 
conflict.  Section Two draws out generalisations regarding conflict dynamics based upon 
the modern history of the region.  Section Three provides short country backgrounders, 
intended as accessible briefs for those new to the history of a particular country.  The 
report has been written so that, if necessary, each section can be read separately.  Of course 
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there is substantial overlap between individual sections and sub-sections, however, the 
report has been divided in such a manner to provide a clarity that would be otherwise 
impossible to convey in a single report of this length.  It is hoped that upon reading the 
whole document, those relatively new to the area will have a basic grasp of both key 
conflict dynamics and country specific backgrounds.  Recommendations for further 
reading have also been provided along with an extensive thematic bibliography.  It must be 
stressed that this report deals predominantly in generalisations based upon a broad analysis 
of the existing literature and as such should not be treated as providing conclusive 
statements but rather as a pathway into further detailed research on any given topic.
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Section One – Regional Aspects of Conflict 
 
Part One - The Regionalisation of Conflict 
 
Whilst it is possible to distinguish broadly geographically and temporally distinct conflicts 
in the modern history of the region, such an approach marginalises the fundamental impact 
of regional determinants of conflict creation, development and resolution.  Stephen Ellis 
states that „Africa‟s wars are today often erroneously understood as internal, rather than 
interstate, conflicts‟ (Ellis 2005).  These prevailing deep-seated assumptions reflect 
theoretical perspectives based on out-dated state-centric paradigmatic constructs for 
explaining conflict, reflected in Western involvement in the region which tends to target 
individual states (often where historical connections exist) whilst largely ignoring regional 
factors.  Conflicts, which may appear on the surface to be intra-state, cannot be fully 
understood in analytical isolation; they are intertwined and interconnected in an extremely 
complex, multi-layered and interdependent fashion.  What is more, informal regional 
structures, alliances and interconnections are in constant flux thus further complicating 
analysis.   
 
Porous Borders 
 
The logical place to start in understanding how conflict becomes regionalised is that of 
borders.  A large proportion of the elements of conflict studied in this report, plus many 
more concerned specifically with post-conflict reconstruction, hinge upon the central issue 
of borders.  The regionalisation of conflict has been fundamentally facilitated by the 
porosity of borders between neighbouring countries and the complex flows of peoples and 
materials across them.  Whilst borders themselves do not represent a significant initial 
causal explanative of internal state conflict (for this we me must look instead to issue of 
poor governance for instance that will be dealt with in Section Two) the simple fact of 
border porosity is central to understanding the intensification and spread of conflict from 
both a regional and internal state perspective.  Porous borders represent the prime 
facilitator of perennial conflict in the region and an analysis of border dynamics reveals in 
stark relief why and how conflict becomes regionalised so rapidly.   
Territorial integrity is a basic element of statehood and vital to the security of any 
country let alone ones caught up in, or emerging from, violent conflict.  Other than 
distinguishing between one country and the next in an abstract sense, the borders in the 
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region are more or less non-existent in practical terms and the capacity of state security 
forces to control borders (land, sea and air) is extremely low.  Indeed, often the only real 
impediments to cross-border movements are natural features such as forests and rivers – a 
rather insignificant obstacle to insurgents accustomed to bush survival.   The borders 
between Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d‟Ivoire have always been so porous that 
the movement of people and goods from one nation to another is virtually unchecked.  The 
unregulated flow and trafficking of small arms, mercenaries, child soldiers, women, drugs, 
and illicit goods represent crucial determinants of destabilisation in the region.  The simple 
fact pertains that conflict cannot be contained in any one country and rebellions that may 
begin as internal problems rapidly become regionalised. 
These processes are further complicated by the existence of ethnic and tribal groups 
straddling the borders in the region.  As is the case with most African countries, state 
borders were arbitrarily created and rarely reflect truly national, ethnic or cultural divides – 
traditional communities were bifurcated in the process.  This fact further undermines the 
meaningfulness of borders and not only facilitates, but also encourages the free flow of 
peoples across borders and allows rebel groups to withdraw to find sanctuary in 
neighbouring countries where they can regroup, recruit and resupply.  For example, the 
Sierra Leone Kamajor (Civil Defence Fighters) largely belonged to tribes which spanned 
the Sierra-Leone/Liberia border, thus in 2001, as Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
fighters retreated into Liberia in response to the disarmament process in Sierra Leone, 
Kamajor efforts to assist Liberian fighters against the RUF were facilitated by their close 
ties and connections with their ethnic kin over the border.  Similar dynamics occur across 
most of the borders in the region, which helps to explain how goods, peoples and arms are 
able to move so freely between states in the region causing continued instability.  Conflict 
thus takes root over borders feeding upon similar sets of resources and socially excluded 
peoples, yet adopts particular characteristics dependent on prevailing national politics. 
Porous borders and the illicit cross-border trade routes between neighbouring states 
represent the arteries of the war economy enabling the smooth running of trans-border 
shadow economies that provide the lifeblood for sustained conflict in the region.  The 
spread of war economies over borders represents another significant way in which conflict 
becomes regionalised as regional actors look beyond their own borders for alternative 
means of economic gain – this subject will be dealt with in Part Two of this section.  
Initiatives which focus on policing borders more effectively, developing border regions 
and encouraging legitimate cross-border trade represent an ideal starting point for 
preventing the vicious cycle of conflict in the region.       
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Case Study of Conflict Regionalisation 
 
One could reveal the process of conflict regionalisation in the area by analysing in detail 
all the instances in which conflict spilled over borders, involved a broad array of regional 
actors or directly impacted upon the politics of a neighbouring state.  However, there is not 
space here to document such processes.  Instead, the following brief case study - which 
essentially takes a cross-section of the second phase of the Liberian civil war (1999-2003) 
– serves to instantiate key regional dynamics, highlights the importance of the region‟s 
porous borders and reveals that individual state conflict cannot be fully comprehended 
irrespective of the wider region.   
 
CASE STUDY: Liberian Civil War 1999-2003 
 
It is widely acknowledged that the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
(LURD) rebellion, which began in 1999 in opposition to Taylor‟s presidency, had very 
close links with Guinea and its president, Lasana Conté.  Taylor instigated Sierra Leone 
RUF (under the leadership of Sam Bockarie) and Liberian rebel incursions into Guinea 
across the Sierra Leone and Liberian borders in 1999-2000 supporting Guinean dissidents 
– hundreds were killed in the fighting.  In response, Guinea backed LURD rebels with 
bases for re-supply, rest and reinforcement in Sierra Leone, Guinea and Voinjama, Lofa 
County, to protect its borders and provided a rear base for the LURD political wing in 
Conakry.  Also, after 2002 an increasing number of former Sierra Leone Kamajor Civil 
Defence Forces fighters joined LURD and assisted arms flows to rebels through south-
eastern Sierra Leone to Liberia. 
The attempted Patriotic Movement of Cote d‟Ivoire (MPCI) coup in September 
2002, which left rebels effectively in control of the entire north of Cote d‟Ivoire and 
foreshadowed the emergence of new anti-Gbagbo rebel groups in the West, allowed Taylor 
to take advantage of instability close to the Liberian border.  Taylor had supported the 
training of, former Ivorian leader, General Guei‟s militias from 2000 to 2001.  Following 
the 2002 coup (in which Guei was killed) Taylor sent former National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (NPFL) and RUF rebels to support the western Ivorian rebel groups against 
Gbagbo in November 2002; a key motivation being his desire to secure important timber 
trade routes to the Ivorian port of San Pedro.  According to Global Witness some 90% of 
the supposedly Ivorian rebel groups, the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) and 
Ivorian Popular Movement for the Great West (MPIGO), were Liberian.  There is also 
evidence that Burkina Faso‟s president, Blaise Compaore, helped arm the rebels, most 
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probably in reaction to Gbagbo‟s targeting of Burkinabes in Cote d‟Ivoire.  Gbagbo 
retaliated by arming and supporting fighters linked to LURD forces in late 2002 which 
culminated in the creation of the Cote d‟Ivoire based LURD splinter group, Movement for 
Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) in early 2003 which, being comprised predominantly of 
ethnic Krahn had strong links with Ivorian Guere across the border.  Thus, western Cote 
d‟Ivoire became another proxy battleground in the Liberian civil war and provided an 
opportunity for fighters across the region to descend upon the area to loot and contract out 
their services as mercenaries. 
 
This brief account of the regional aspects of the 1999-2003 Liberian civil war clearly 
reveals that the conflict was crucially shaped and affected by regional factors, typified by: 
external government support for foreign rebels against internal dissent; attempts to control 
foreign resources to fund military operations; the ebb and flow of conflict across national 
borders; the widespread operations of mercenaries fighting for both government and rebel 
forces; and the network of cross border trade routes which fuelled the interconnected 
regional war economies.   
The regionalisation of conflict represents the most pressing challenge for those trying 
to prevent its continued occurrence and recurrence in the area.  Positive developments in 
one country can be swiftly undermined by instability in neighbouring states, sweeping 
away in an instant, years of steady development and progress.  A regional approach to 
conflict prevention is thus crucial.  This entails the implementation of programmes that are 
sensitive to the regional dynamics outlined above.  Programmes targeted only on 
individual states may cause substantial instability in neighbouring countries by upsetting 
intricate cross-border social and economic balances, whilst failing to realise that security in 
the region depends as much on external (neighbouring states) stability as on independent 
internal stability.   
 
Part Two - Region-wide Characteristics of Conflict 
 
In addition to the process of regionalisation outlined above, conflict in the area can be 
considered regional in the sense that it generally displays a number of common 
characteristics irrespective of the country in which it is taking place.  It is possible to draw 
out a number of central issues and themes that are pertinent explanatives across both 
borders and time, an understanding of which are vital for those engaged in the region. 
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The Character and Actions of Armed Groups 
 
A wide variety of armed groups operate throughout the region.  These groups include 
rebels, government armed forces, civil defence forces and private militias.  Whilst there are 
of course significant differences between these groups regarding such aspects as 
organisation, ethnic composition and purpose, there also exist a number of pertinent 
region-wide commonalities between them.  First, child soldiers have been extensively 
employed by both rebel and government forces.  Second, civilians have been the prime 
targets and victims of all these groups.  Third, mercenaries operate throughout the entire 
region and are regularly employed by rebels and government forces.  An analysis of each 
of these areas in turn will provide an essential background regarding the ways in which the 
perpetrators of violence operate and their impact on civilian populations.   
 
(i) The Use of Child Soldiers.   
 
The use of children (boys and girls) in armed groups has been a distressing feature of 
conflict in the region from its earliest days.  It is a phenomenon that has accelerated and 
become a defining feature of the wars – indeed, the image of gun wielding youths, some 
wearing masks and wigs, has often been used for the covers of books on conflict in the 
region.  The growth in the number of child soldiers throughout the globe is a process 
characteristic of new wars.  This is not a process confined to West Africa‟s conflicts.  
There are perhaps several hundred thousand child soldiers active in the world today.  The 
following brief analysis of this worrying characteristic of new wars, as witnessed in the 
Mano River region, reveals some of the factors that have contributed to this trend. 
The recruitment of child soldiers has been facilitated by a number of factors apparent 
in the region.  First, there are those factors that have made children valuable assets for 
armed groups.  Due to the fact that civilians have become the main targets and victims of 
these wars, the social dislocation and upheaval this has caused meant that huge populations 
of orphans and displaced children became easy recruits for armed groups.  Many children 
joined armed groups when their parents were killed or they were separated from them.  In 
this sense, supply was not an obstacle and given the high death toll of fighters during the 
conflicts, the ready supply of children was required to replenish ranks.  Sometimes 
children were actively pushed into joining armed groups by family members who either 
demanded or persuaded them to play a part in toppling the regime, pushing back rebels 
(protective duties) or bringing back money to the family gained in the course of fighting.  
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Also, because modern weapons are increasingly easy to understand and handle they can be 
put in the hands of young children who only require basic training and familiarisation with 
their operation.  What is more, children are extremely easy for commanders to manipulate 
and will follow orders when compelled.  These factors have contributed to the widespread 
forced conscription (often at gunpoint) of children into armed groups of both governments 
and rebels. 
This is only half of the picture however, and ignores the fact that children often, for a 
number of reasons, voluntarily join the ranks of armed groups or feel they have no other 
choice, despite not being forced.  Joining an armed group can offer displaced youths with 
the prospect of access to cash and material benefits, the prospect of excitement and 
adventure, and even the prospect of improved security.  In many cases young people made 
the calculation that they would be better protected as part of an armed group than 
remaining prey to them – ironically war became a survival mechanism.  Also, revenge 
played an important motivational factor in prompting voluntary recruitment – children who 
had seen awful abuses committed against their families wished to exact revenge against the 
perpetrators.   
We also must remember that these conflicts took place in a context in which youth 
had been starved of opportunities and held back by societies dominated by tribal elders – 
for many, conflict was an escape: a way of turning the tables on those they felt were 
responsible for their social exclusion and powerlessness.  Also, a number of reports point 
to the fact that family cohesion had broken down during conflict and children felt unloved 
and uncared for – for some, joining an armed group was a means of becoming part of a 
new „family‟ in which they have a purpose and in which their commanders become father-
like figures (however, this is not to suggest they were always cared for – abuses, torture 
and beatings by commanders was common).  Michael Ignatieff has also pointed towards 
the sexual dimension of war; the idea that the wild testosterone fuelled sexuality of 
adolescent males finds its release through the phallic symbol of the gun.  Linked to this is 
the notion that wielding a firearm signifies having reached maturity (Ignatieff, 1998).  
These factors may have also helped fuel recruitment as well as contributing to the savagery 
shown towards their victims.           
Once recruited the children are provided with very basic training and then they 
would be required to perform all sorts of tasks additional to actual fighting.  Many 
undertook military support tasks such as manning checkpoints, spying, cooking, stealing, 
foraging for food, and other forms of manual labour.  Apart from these tasks children were 
frequently complicit in abuses against civilians such as murder, rape, burning houses, 
kidnapping and looting.  In actual battles children were often sent to the front line, whilst 
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elder fighters took up more strategic positions – the children were essentially used as 
human shields with the intention that opposing combatants might hesitate in killing a child.  
Children often had access to weapons although this did not mean they had access to 
firearms at all times.  Often they were provided weapons for specific purposes when the 
situation warranted it, such as when repelling an attack.    
A number of other features relating to the experiences of children in these conflicts 
have been reported by various sources.  A number of methods were used to induce extra 
courage, shamelessness and fearlessness in children.  Drug and alcohol abuse was 
widespread.  Child soldiers would be fuelled with lethal concoctions of cocaine, 
gunpowder and alcohol by commanders and sent to perform specific tasks such as 
providing „bait‟ for attacks.  In this sense, supplying drugs to children was a strategic 
calculation on the part of commanders in that it provided them with fighters who would 
have no hesitation in committing abuses.  In some cases, drugs were forcibly injected.  
Thus, many of the worst atrocities committed during conflict were by children with little or 
no idea of right or wrong, mercy or sympathy. 
  
(ii)  The Targeting of Civilians   
 
A defining feature of the actions of armed groups in the region is that their violence has 
overwhelmingly been directed towards civilians.  This is a phenomenon present in many of 
the new wars throughout the world – the ratio of military to civilian casualties currently 
stands at around 1:8.  However, these shockingly high casualty figures reveal only part of 
the picture.  Civilians have also suffered horrific human rights abuses such as rape, forced 
labour, torture, mutilations and beatings – these abuses have been clearly and 
systematically documented by human rights organisations such as Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch.  Perhaps the most notorious of armed groups responsible for 
such atrocities in the region was the RUF in Sierra Leone who made a habit of amputating 
victims arms.  Also, many thousands have been displaced by conflict, either fleeing to 
other parts of their country or to refugee camps abroad.  No single report, book or article 
can even begin to portray the horror experienced by hundreds of thousands of civilians in 
the region.  Faced with such evidence, it becomes tempting to conclude that the armed 
groups committing such atrocities are nothing more than gangs of mindless and 
remorseless killers.  That civilians become the main victims of armed groups undoubtedly 
seems to defy traditional logic.  For example, if the stated aim of insurgents is to overthrow 
a corrupt government in the name of „the people,‟ why do those same insurgents resort to 
massacring the very people in whose name they are supposedly fighting?  Explanations of 
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mindlessness are convenient but insufficient if we are to truly understand why armed 
groups commit such acts of barbarity. There are a number of observable reasons for the 
targeting of civilians during conflict in the region which can help us begin to explain 
(although not necessarily justify or excuse) this awful phenomenon. 
A number of psychological factors concerning the state of mind of the fighters are 
of undoubted importance in explaining the violence against civilians.  For many, violence 
is an assertion of power and for those who have been in a situation of almost complete 
powerlessness we can expect the urge to assert power to be strong.  David Keen also 
stresses the importance of shame and describes how fighters may try to eliminate the 
sources of their shame by attacking those who reawaken such feelings or attempt to 
transfer shame on those being abused through humiliating acts such as sexual violence, 
amputations and public ridicule.  Further to this point, fighters may also feel violence is a 
way of achieving respect and recognition – the gun demands respect.  The atmosphere of 
impunity in many of the conflicts in the region, whereby fighters would not be punished 
for crimes, fed into violent behaviour – indeed, violence towards civilians was actively 
encouraged and refusal to take part could result in punishment, thus normal notions of right 
and wrong became strangely inversed.  Of course the widespread use of drugs by fighters 
only served to further destabilise the minds of fighters.  The essential point here is that we 
must consider violence committed against civilians from the point of view of the fighter – 
this brief summary reveals just some of the ways certain acts become justified and indeed, 
necessary, for those involved in such abuses.   
Further to these psychological factors, the targeting of civilians is closely related to 
a number of economic factors.  Many killings and abuses are committed during the looting 
of villages and towns – often those who had nothing to give would be killed and violence 
was used to force civilians to flee so goods could be looted with greater ease. Many 
civilians were used as forced labour for such tasks as farming, mining and carrying 
equipment for fighting forces.  Also, we should not discount the importance of political 
and ethnic factors.  For example, civilians that are seen as supportive of the „enemy‟ or 
those belonging to particular ethnic groups were particularly susceptible to systematic 
executions and appalling abuses.  (Keen, 2005; Ellis, 1999) 
Explaining the phenomenon of large-scale violence against civilians in the region is 
a complex and uncertain task – as has been shown, the reasons are diverse and range from 
the mindset of an individual fighter to the economic imperatives of the armed group.  The 
purpose of this brief account has been to illustrate that, for a number of identifiable 
reasons, when conflict breaks out in the region it is reasonably safe to assume – based on 
the lessons of history – that civilians will become the prime targets of armed groups.  The 
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humanitarian and human rights implications of this are massive.  The fact that some 
credible explanations have been proffered to explain this reality suggests solutions are 
achievable – we are not simply faced with mindless barbarism.  Certain key issues must be 
faced and efforts implemented to address them, for example: judicial institutions capable 
of holding perpetrators of such crimes to account will help to undermine the culture of 
impunity that persists in the region; education is vital for teaching basic notions of morality 
and acceptable behaviour; efforts to promote community cohesion and equality of 
opportunity can encourage proper notions of responsibility and respect whilst undermining 
the urge in some potential combatants to „turn the tables‟ and exact revenge against those 
they feel are responsible for their powerlessness; and initiatives that target the flow of 
drugs and arms into the region can help remove two of the most important ingredients for 
widespread atrocities.   
In the modern history of the region the majority of the populations of countries in 
the region have suffered enormously at the hands of a brutal minority.  Too many lives 
have been ended or utterly destroyed by the actions of that minority.  The international 
community has not done enough to prevent atrocities in the past.  In the future, given the 
high potential for renewed conflict in the region, international actors must be prepared to 
act with the necessary resolve to protect innocent civilians caught up in conflict.  Whilst 
humanitarian emergency responses are crucial (such as establishing and managing refugee 
and IDP camps to cater for displaced civilians) and the introduction of peacekeepers can 
help deter some of the worst atrocities, unfortunately the record tells us that this has not 
been enough to prevent suffering on an unimaginable scale.  In this respect, greater 
consideration should be accorded to the notion of „humanitarian intervention‟ – that is, the 
threat or use of force by states to prevent or put an end to serious violations of human 
rights – as a potential means of saving civilians from the consequences of conflict in the 
region.  The debate over humanitarian intervention is ongoing and hotly contested.  .  What 
is more, even if all states were to unanimously agree that humanitarian intervention was 
the right or „just‟ course of action, there is no certainty that it would necessarily take place, 
particularly in a region where the potential for western casualties would be high. This is 
not the place to expand on these arguments, suffice to say that alternatives need to be 
considered if we are serious about preventing another generation of innocent West 
African‟s being blighted with the horrific consequences of violent conflict.  
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(iii) The Hiring of Mercenaries 
 
In the recent history of the region armed groups have made extensive use of regional 
mercenaries, or „floating warriors,‟ to fill their ranks.  These mercenaries capitalise on the 
region‟s porous borders to travel to whereever they can ply their trade.  The mercenaries 
are usually veterans of earlier civil wars who were forcibly recruited by rebel groups when 
children.  They are primarily motivated by prospects of economic gain after finding 
themselves unemployed and existing in dire poverty following the cessation of hostilities.  
In many respects, this reveals the inadequacy of previous Disarmament, Demobilisation 
and Reintegration (DDR) processes initiated in the region (Liberia 1997, Sierra Leone 
1999-2003, Liberia 2002-2005 and Cote d‟Ivoire).  As a result of years of war in the region 
a large pool of ex-combatants exist as potential recruits for armed groups operating in the 
region.  Recruiters are able to lure fighters with the opportunity of payment and a share in 
the spoils of war.  Thus, the „push‟ and „pull‟ factors are strong for those fighters 
contemplating hiring themselves out as regional mercenaries, plus the context of regional 
instability means this process can continue more of less without hindrance.  They are able 
to float in and out of wars in the region, operating where and when they wish – from one 
perspective they can be viewed as entrepreneurs making the most of a skill they have 
acquired and where the demand for that skill is high. 
During Liberia‟s second civil war between 1999 and 2003 it estimated that well over 
one thousand regional warriors took part, with the majority fighting for the LURD rebel 
group.  More recently, in 2005 a number of reports have expressed concern over the 
Ivorian recruitment of recently demobilised children to fight with pro-government militias 
there.  The easily manipulated children were being lured with the prospect of financial 
compensation and the opportunity of paying themselves through looting. The children 
ended up in armed groups comprised mainly of former Liberian MODEL fighters recruited 
for service in Cote d‟Ivoire.  A similar process has been witnessed with regard to Guinea – 
Liberian ex-combatants have been recruited into pro and anti Guinean forces.  These 
examples again reveal the extent to which the conflicts in the region have become deeply 
intertwined (HRW, March 2005, ICG June 2005 - Guinea).   
Perhaps the most distressing consequence of the existence of regional warriors is the 
brutality and lack of respect for human rights which they export to other parts of the 
region.  As Human Rights Watch reveals, most of the fighters have fought with the two 
armed groups (RUF and NPFL) in the region notorious for their appalling abuses against 
civilians (HRW, April 2005).  These abuses have been outlined above.  The introduction of 
foreign fighters into an internal conflict has often led to a dramatic increase in violence 
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against civilians.  This occurred, for example, when the Liberian backed rebel groups (MJP 
and MPIGO) became involved in the Ivorian conflict in 2002.  The indiscipline and scale 
of abuses committed by the foreign fighters were sufficiently high to compel the MPCI 
(predominantly composed of Ivorians) commanders to purge the Forces Nouvelles (after 
the three rebel groups had merged) of Liberian and Sierra Leonean elements (Small Arms 
Survey, 2005). 
 
International Involvement and Aid  
 
The emergence of new wars, as outlined in the introduction, prompted a change in the 
security emphasis within the international community from Cold War threats of interstate 
conflict to the notion that regional conflicts, with their roots in underdevelopment, 
represented the prime threats to international peace and stability.  Whilst these conflicts 
were primarily rooted in internal communal tensions they became crises that inevitably 
involved other states, threatened international peace and security, and demanded outside 
intervention.  This process led to a variety of interventions to deal with these so-called 
„complex emergencies‟ from a multitude of international actors.  These interventions have 
had differing aims ranging from attempts to simply separate the warring parties through the 
imposition of peacekeeping forces, through efforts designed to limit human suffering by 
delivering humanitarian aid, to the radical social transformation of target states to promote 
development and security.  All these forms of intervention have been present, to differing 
extents, in the Mano River region and Cote d‟Ivoire and they have had both deleterious and 
beneficial consequences.  This section maps out two principal ways in which foreign 
involvement in the region has impacted on and in many ways shaped the nature of conflict 
in the region.   
 
(i) Western State Intervention 
 
Foreign state intervention in the region has been characterised by certain Western states 
assuming responsibility for traditional spheres of influence (Britain in Sierra Leone, 
America in Liberia, and France in Guinea and Cote d‟Ivoire) based upon long standing 
historical ties.  This parochial bilateral approach has led to a lack of international 
cooperation and coordination in tackling problems that are in fact regional in nature (as 
outlined above) and has also been reflected in the UN‟s engagement which has done little 
to foster great power regional cooperation, preferring instead to institutionalise the 
continued dominance of traditional lead states in individual countries of the region.  The 
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largely uncoordinated and uneven nature of the disarmament and demobilisation plans are 
a clear reflection of this problem – the payout for the Ivorian disarmament program being 
$900 which is three times what the Liberian program paid out (ICG, June 2005 - Guinea).   
This has the effect of encouraging fighters to move across borders to take advantage of 
such inequities, thus further destabilising the region. 
 It is not enough, for example, for Britain to focus solely upon peacebuilding in 
Sierra Leone and hope that sound internal policies will ensure stability.  It must realise that 
Sierra Leone‟s future fundamentally depends on developments and events in the region.  
Although, it may lack the historical connections with Liberia and has no embassy there, all 
efforts must be made to ensure coordination with the US led reconstruction process in the 
full knowledge that renewed conflict in Liberia will almost certainly have devastating 
consequences in Sierra Leone.  The same logic applies in relation to Cote d‟Ivoire and the 
need for Britain and France to coordinate their West African strategies.  The need for 
strategies (these may take the form of coordinated land and air border patrols or regulated 
sanctions regimes for instance) that take into account regional dynamics and that require 
integrated Western state cooperation is something that is belatedly coming to be seen as 
critical for long-term conflict resolution and prevention in the area (the ICG has been 
particularly vocal in advocating such regional engagement).   
 
(ii) Aid 
 
The massive humanitarian emergencies created by conflict in the region prompted 
involvement from a variety of aid agencies, donor states and international financial 
institutions.  International aid has been crucial in terms of mitigating some of the appalling 
suffering caused by war but there is another side of the coin that warrants analysis here.  
The record of these actors in the region over the years has been extremely mixed and 
indeed, there has been considerable debate as to the efficacy of aid provision in such 
complex conflicts.  This debate is vital because, given the complex nature of conflict in the 
region, there is a very real possibility that the actions of well-meaning aid agencies can 
unwittingly contribute to processes and dynamics that end up exacerbating or contributing 
to conflict.  These debates have focused on a number of central problems that will be 
briefly outlined below.  (It should be noted that the following outlines are those issues 
highlighted in the literature and are only intended as simplified introductions to what are 
extremely complicated matters).  
 A central and well-known criticism is that of aid being diverted to support the war effort 
of armed groups thus strengthening and sustaining them.  This has occurred in a number of 
 2
1 
2
1
ways: rebel groups have demanded custom duties, protection money or taxation from 
humanitarian relief convoys; relief convoys have also been ambushed, looted and in some 
cases, vehicles and radios commandeered; civilians who have been the beneficiaries of aid 
have subsequently been looted by armed groups; or those civilians have traded relief on the 
black market with armed groups.  The issue of diversion is clearly evinced by the massive 
looting of the INGO base in Gbarnga, Liberia in 1994 which amounted to $10m in losses, 
with many of the stolen trucks and vehicles subsequently used on the front line by the 
responsible armed factions. 
 Another criticism of international aid efforts has been that it encouraged government 
abuses and impeded relief efforts due to the reluctance of donors to make aid conditional 
on human rights observance.    The general point here is that emergency aid was essentially 
used a substitute or smokescreen for effective diplomatic action to address humanitarian 
crises and prevent abuses.  Thus, government forces involved in widespread abuses of 
civilians (as outlined above) were often being supplied and funded through loans that were 
supposedly earmarked for development.  This was particularly noticeable in Sierra Leone 
in the early 1990s where aid to the National Provisional Revolutionary Council 
government proceeded in an atmosphere of „institutional optimism‟ amongst donors as 
regards the character of the regime thus obscuring the reality of large-scale violence 
committed against civilians by government troops.  This not only constituted a form of 
tacit support for government abuses but also deepened rebel intransigence with, and 
mistrust of, international organisations thus hampering negotiations and endangering relief 
operations because of a perceived lack of neutrality and even-handedness.  Similar 
processes have been noted in respect to the civil war in Liberia. 
 Aid can also cause problems through the way it affects those who are excluded from its 
benefits.  Often relief failed to make its way to the poorest or most needy sections of 
society for various reasons such as the siphoning off of aid through corrupt practices (also 
often the most needy were those with the least political muscle to claim relief).  Indeed, 
rebel held areas were often the least well supplied.  This had the effect of increasing 
recruitment to rebel groups in such areas as a means of survival, encouraging attacks on 
relief convoys and aid workers, and generally making rebel groups sceptical of aid 
neutrality (thus increasing the risk of attacks to humanitarian personnel).  Also, the lack of 
relief reaching rebel held territory could help speed up the depopulation of those areas, as 
people would be drawn by the prospect of humanitarian relief at camps.    
 Another common criticism of relief operations, linked to the last point, is that it can 
destroy local capacity and foster dependency by flooding areas with resources thus 
reducing incentives for local producers and causing beneficiaries to become dependent on 
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aid provision.  This is however a very basic assumption that ignores some key dynamics in 
the region.  The idea that populations might develop a „dependency syndrome‟ has been 
used by some aid agencies (notably UN agencies) to reduce relief supplies in favour of 
development, whilst lauding peoples‟ coping strategies.  This approach conveniently 
ignores the negative aspects of coping strategies that may in some cases amount to 
prostitution, begging, stealing or occupying other peoples‟ homes – practices that should 
not be encouraged by drawing down relief.  Whilst the dependency argument may be 
strong, it should not be used as an excuse for speedily drawing down relief in a context of 
massive displacement, uncertainty and fear.  The relief-dependency debate is extremely 
complex when considered in the context of violent conflict.  The purpose here has been 
merely to raise it as an issue warranting further careful and considered analysis.  
 
The War Economy 
 
Another primary factor playing into the development of conflict in the region is that of war 
economies.  The precise character and workings of war economies are extremely hard to 
pin down due to their unregulated nature and because their tentacles reach far beyond the 
confines of state boundaries.  Indeed, the impact of war economies on the regionalisation 
of conflict facilitated by porous borders and chronic regional instability, as discussed 
above, should not be understated.  The specific war economies of the countries studied in 
this report must all be understood as individual nodes within a complex web of non-formal 
transnational trade networks.  However, it is more appropriate to discuss this phenomenon 
separately here because its central springs are to be found in the internal collapse of 
established economic structures and the subsequent emergence of new licit and illicit 
mechanisms at both micro and macro levels.  These internal transformations then become 
locked into regional and transnational structures that perpetuate and deepen its operation.  
Whilst there is not room here to delve into the intricacies of the mechanisms involved in 
war economies, there are a number of central aspects that we can expect to observe during 
conflict and that continue to hamper post-conflict reconstruction in the region. 
 
(i) War economies as social transformation 
 
As Professor Mark Duffield has made clear, violent conflict should not simply be seen as 
breakdown and collapse but rather as involving forms of social reordering and 
transformation (Duffield, 2001).  In this sense, the war economies that emerge need to be 
conceived as a form of actual development based on adaptation, some level of rational 
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calculus and the creation of alternative systems of profit and power.  Whilst the 
development of war economies may appear morally offensive to the international 
community due to their criminalized, exclusionary, inequitable and violent nature based on 
the pursuit of private gain, we should also be aware they involve innovation, adaptation 
and deep social transformation at all levels.  This has important policy implications that 
will be discussed below.  The war economies of the new wars in the region are largely the 
result of a quest for self-sufficiency (in the absence of any superpower patronage) by 
armed factions to develop ways of mobilising resources to maintain war-fighting 
capabilities and power structures.  The informal economies that emerge have far reaching 
implications for entire societies; as much for those directly implicated in new transnational 
trading networks as for the ordinary civilian entirely excluded from its inequitable 
distributive mechanisms.   
Some, such as Paul Collier at the World Bank, have claimed that „greed‟, economic 
exploitation and loot-seeking represent key causes and drivers of conflict themselves 
(Collier 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2001).  Whilst this thesis may contain some truth and it 
is an undoubted fact that some rebels aim to directly profit from conflict, the argument 
ignores other important factors, not least the fact that some rebels are motivated more by a 
sheer need to survive, while others have been forced into joining the rebellion.  Also, the 
„greed‟ thesis crucially ignores the predatory role of the state in perpetuating conflict 
through pecuniary practices, organised violent exploitation, and the fact that it is often the 
very kleptocratic and corrupt nature of the state that compels rebels to fight in order to get 
at a piece of the pie.  The cause of conflict in the region is not reducible to greed, nor is the 
working of war economy.  When analysing the economic complexities of conflict we are 
not dealing simply with rebels bent on personal profit.  Instead we are dealing with an 
array of actors including, for example, government personnel, warlords, aid agencies and 
civilians who interact in various ways and operate according to a multiplicity of 
motivations, whether it be the ordinary civilian who engages in cross-border smuggling in 
order to survive, the rank and file rebel who loots an air-conditioning unit and sells it over 
the border to government officials in exchange for cash, or the warlord extracting 
diamonds to fund arms purchases.             
 
(ii) Basic characteristics of war economies   
 
War economies involve the destruction or circumvention of the formal economy and the 
growth of informal markets of production and distribution based largely upon pillage, 
extortion and violence against civilians, and are highly decentralised and privatised.  
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Combatants come to rely primarily on the exploitation of, and cross-border trade in, natural 
resources and other lootable commodities involving complex regional and transnational 
trading networks.  Civilians have to learn ways to adapt their behaviour and livelihoods in 
order to survive or to capitalise on any available opportunities that present themselves.  It 
must also be stated that war economies are not usefully separated into illicit and licit 
economies - the distinction is rarely clear-cut because of the manner in which conflict trade 
is integrated into the global economic system (Taylor, 2003).  A large „grey area‟ exists 
between the two during conflict because it can be extremely difficult to determine when 
specific laws apply or where certain activities represent non-threatening survival strategies 
at a local level.   
The functional aspects of war economies have been usefully categorised into 
„combat‟, „shadow‟ and „coping‟ economies.  Combat economies are based upon 
interactions that directly sustain combat through predatory taxation, extortion, exploitation 
of resources, the imposition of „customs‟ in border regions, and capturing foreign aid.  
Shadow economies encompass informal economic relationships outside state-regulated 
frameworks involving criminal elements smuggling various commodities and resources.  
The shadow economy can easily be hijacked by combatants and thus becomes the base for 
the combat economy.  Coping economies involve poor and vulnerable people struggling to 
survive during conflict who engage in small-scale cross-border smuggling, subsistence 
farming and petty trade (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005).     
The war economy operates at both the macro and the micro level with important 
interconnections and overlap between the two at, what is termed, the meso level.  Macro 
level economic activities relate primarily to the large-scale extraction and export of 
resources involving governments, rebel leaders, foreign companies and powerful 
individuals.  Political elites and warlords compete for control of resources using military 
strategies supported by international commercial ties.  This can sometimes entail the 
warlord strategy of large-scale cross-border offensives in order to secure resource rich 
areas or key trading routes (Taylor‟s support of the initial RUF incursion into Sierra Leone 
in 1991 was largely based on his desire to integrate Sierra Leone‟s diamond reserves into 
his expansive commercial network).  Given the collapse of traditional revenue collecting 
systems, governments seek alternative funding to sustain their violent activities such as 
diverting existing resources towards fighting units.  Also, corrupt government regulatory 
and taxation practices divert resources for personal profit and factional gain.  At this level 
we should also include the support given from external states in the form of money, arms 
and equipment. 
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At the micro level we can observe the activities of local populations and fighters who 
adopt a range of survival strategies in a context of the collapse of government distributive 
mechanisms.  Subsistence farming is the basic means of survival for local populations, 
however some civilians attempt to continue pre-war production of cash crops which they 
may attempt to trade through the illegal war economy or through interactions with fighters 
in some cases.  Humanitarian assistance and diaspora remittances may also be recycled 
through the war economy via black market transactions at the micro level.  The economic 
activities of fighters at the micro level includes small scale extraction of resources, 
smuggling, checkpoint extortion, looting and „taxation‟ of humanitarian assistance.  Also, 
the very act of enlisting in a militia may represent a micro economic coping strategy for 
ordinary civilians. 
The macro and the micro aspects of the war economy overlap at the meso level 
where we can expect to see, for example, direct deals between local faction leaders and 
foreign companies, plantations and mining facilities run by local commanders and illegal 
relationships between government officials and armed factions.  Thus, while we can 
distinguish between the central aspects of these different layers of the war economy, it is 
important to be aware that they overlap and impact upon each other directly.  The 
following chart from Mary Kaldor‟s book clearly highlights some of the most important 
resource flows observable in the war economies that have emerged in the region (Kaldor, 
1999).   
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(iii) Implications 
 
The complexity of the war economies presents a number of difficult problems for those 
engaged in the region.  The distinctions between those who are involved in the war 
economy for profit and power, and those who are forced to participate in order to survive 
are hard to determine.  The interconnected nature and ingrained nature of the war economy 
means that changes in one area can importantly impact upon others: changes at the macro 
level can impact upon micro processes or shocks to the combat economy can massively 
affect those involved in the coping economy.  As stated earlier, the development of war 
economies entails a fundamental transformation of existing social relations and economic 
interactions.  The adaptations and strategies adopted as a result of the realities of conflict 
become deeply embedded in society leading to a vicious cycle that perpetuates conflict and 
makes its resolution all the more difficult.  Also, the cross-border and transnational nature 
of the war economies means that attempts to dismantle them have to be aware of processes 
occurring far beyond the confines of any one state.   
Initiatives must be carefully targeted towards replacing illegitimate mechanisms with 
legitimate ones; a complex surgical task, whereby, in attempting to remove a cancerous 
organ associated with the combat economy, one might also be depriving ordinary civilians 
of their means of survival due to the deeply interconnected nature of economic relations 
developed during conflict.  The transition from illicit war economies to licit peace 
economies requires a social transformation as deep and far reaching as the initial 
transformations that led to the war economy in the first instance.  Just as winners and 
losers are created through the mechanisms of new power structures associated with the war 
economy, this is also the case when attempting to terminate them.  „Spoilers‟ of peace 
processes can emerge who feel the potential benefits of peace are not outweighed by those 
of war.  Thus, the central task facing those attempting to transform war economies 
essentially comes down to making peace more profitable than war.     
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Section Two – Conflict Dynamics Overview 
 
Introduction 
 
This section presents an overview, based on historical observation and analysis, of the 
causes of conflict, the way in which conflict develops, spreads and intensifies and the 
subsequent feedback mechanisms which engender renewed conflict and undermine 
attempts at peaceful resolution.  These dynamics will be presented in the broadest possible 
sense and are intended to simply provide the reader with a preliminary feel for the way the 
various elements of conflict interact and connect.  It will also serve as an analytical 
framework for understanding more clearly the country backgrounders presented in Section 
Three.  Some of the issues have been dealt with in greater detail in the previous section 
relating to regional aspects of conflict.  Yet, this overview changes the perspective 
somewhat, to view conflict as it emerges from within an individual state.  
The following analysis is best understood if used in conjunction with the flow chart 
presented in Annex IV at the end of the report.  The chart reveals some of the most 
important processes taking place during conflict in the region.  It is not exhaustive and 
does not purport to show every possible factor or relationship between factors – such a 
chart would be so complex that it would be rendered incomprehsible.  The chart aims to 
provide a basic diagrammatical representation of key factors and relationships, and, in 
general, to simply provide a sense of the complexity of conflict.  It must be stressed that 
the chart and the following analysis are based upon broad generalisations to facilitate 
analytical clarity.  The factors presented do not necessarily relate to every country or every 
instance of civil strife, however, we can expect any particular country in the region at any 
particular time to display some of the following elements. 
 
Primary Causes and Beginnings 
 
Key Points: 
 Poor governance 
 Social Exclusion 
 Poverty 
 
The central origin of conflict in the region is that of poor governance characterised 
primarily by endemic corruption and exclusionary politics.  The prevalence of weak 
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governance itself can largely be explained by a number of factors: colonial history and 
decolonisation processes; the record of post-colonial African rule which institutionalised 
nefarious kleptocratic government practices such as one-party rule and authoritarianism; 
the existence of vast natural resources; a fundamental lack of governmental accountability 
and transparency; and the drying up of aid and the end of patron-client politics after the 
end of the Cold War. Therefore, it is not so much a problem of power collapsing, but rather 
that proper notions of responsible power have never existed in the region. 
Poor governance in turn creates „haves‟ and „have-nots‟: the later being the majority 
of the population. The key term here is exclusion.  Widespread poverty, unemployment, 
lack of education and the inability of the state to provide basic functions incenses large 
swathes of the excluded society whose grievances are compounded by such patent 
inequality: wealth generated by abundant resources does not trickle down to ordinary 
citizens.  Suppression of political opposition and civil society by the state (using state 
security forces whose primary role should in fact be to protect citizens) fuels further 
acrimony and plugs possible release-valves for pent up vexations.  Political oppression 
may not always play out along distinctly ethnic lines (although in some countries such as 
Cote d‟Ivoire the ethnic causal element is strong) but, in most cases, an early ethnic 
element can be identified – leaders often choose to surround themselves with members of 
their tribe or ethnic group.   
 
CASE STUDY: Sierra Leone under Siaka Stevens, 1970s and early 1980s 
 
Perhaps the clearest example of this process occurred in Sierra Leone under the rule of 
Siaka Stevens who used a system of patronage to reward insiders and close allies whilst 
building up a personal fortune.  The political elite was adept at manipulating economic 
decline for private gain.  Stevens used the ethnicised political atmosphere to legitimate a 
one party rule, using his Special Security Division to intimidate outsiders who expressed 
dissatisfaction.  For the ordinary people, the state did not really exist – it was a „shadow 
state‟ that did not provide services, particularly in rural areas, or inspire loyalty.  The 
country remained one of the poorest in the world despite its fertility and large mineral 
reserves. 
Also, violence and intimidation used at elections (such as in 1982) set a bad example 
and encouraged the notion that „violence pays‟ and is the shortest route to success – a 
precedent which became a defining feature of the civil war.  The suppression of civil 
society meant there was no outlet for pent up grievances.  When the economy began to 
completely collapse in the 1980s, the dilapidated state of the country‟s agricultural sector, 
 30 
massive poverty and low levels of education meant grievances against the state were high.  
This provided the general background and context within which conflict was to take root. 
(Keen, 2005) 
 
Nascent opposition elements tend to form broad ethnic alliances tied together by 
common grievances.  However, as we shall see, these alliances often break down as the 
prospect of achieving power nears and conflict subsequently assumes an increased ethnic 
nature.  So, small groups of insurgents begin to form around charismatic and wealthy 
leaders (such as Charles Taylor in Liberia and Foday Sankoh in Sierra Leone).  These 
groups seek support from both potential foreign government allies with old scores to settle 
(e.g Houphet-Boigny‟s support for Taylor) or an interest in provoking instability (e.g 
Libyan support for Taylor) and, also, with other disaffected civilians in sympathy with 
their cause.  At this stage, rebel ideology can be expected to be overwhelmingly political in 
nature in the respect that it is focused on regime change fuelled by grievances against the 
state.  However, it is appertain at this point to draw a distinction between the motivations 
of the rank and file of the rebellion and rebel leaders.  For the rank and file we can expect 
various grievances to represent primary motivational factors whereas for rebel leaders the 
prospect of power, the desire to settle old scores or the prospect of economic gain may be 
more important factors.  Both are crucially dependent on each other.  Conflict emerges 
from a combination of rebel leaders manipulating and using grievances within certain 
elements of the population to pursue personal agendas.   
 
Early Conflict Development 
 
Key Points: 
 Initial rebel successes despite small numbers 
 Foreign engagement insufficient to prevent conflict development 
 Rebel advance contained – stalemate and small scale fighting 
 Development of war economy 
 Massive population movements – humanitarian emergency 
 
Despite their small numbers, initial rebel incursions or attempted coups often see relatively 
considerable succeses (e.g RUF, NPFL, MPCI) for a number of reasons: (i) The clear 
ideology of the rebel groups at this time strikes a chord with many disaffected civilians 
thus facilitating voluntary recruitment to their ranks, general support such as provision of 
food and shelter, or acquiescence.  (ii) Foreign government support (e.g Guinea‟s support 
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of LURD or Taylor‟s support for western Ivorian rebel groups) ensures a continued supply 
of arms, munitions and equipment, as well as potential sanctuary for rest and regrouping – 
this prevents quick and easy government victories against the insurgency.  (iii) The central 
state security sector (due primarily to rampant corruption and inefficiency) is largely 
incapable of responding effectively to the rebel threat.  The armed forces are generally 
characterised by poor pay, low morale and corrupt commanders.  The subsequent 
(inevitable) rushed recruitment drive in the face of rebel advances only serves to heighten 
these problems.   
Foreign engagement at this stage generally may take a number of forms.  (i) Regional 
peacekeepers may be sent to separate the belligerents, however, there will normally be an 
institutional bias against rebel groups which fuels discontent still further and undermines 
future peacekeeping missions whilst doing little to target the cause of conflict.  (ii) Western 
states will tend to engage somewhat belatedly and with little knowledge of the causes of 
the conflict or the ideology of the rebel groups thus provoking a response characterised 
generally by incoherence and hesitation.  (iii) Ineffectual peace-accords aimed at political 
reconciliation through instituting governments of national unity or such like may be 
brokered.  However, again, these accords do little to tackle the underlying causes of the 
conflict, as grievances will still be high, corruption still rampant and rebel groups still 
active.  For example, it took some six years before an acceptable accord was reached in 
Liberia in 1995 and these problems are currently being played out in Cote d‟Ivoire as it 
struggles to reach a durable agreement. 
The early days of the conflict are thus characterised by initial rebel advances (that 
may come very close to toppling the regime or taking the capital) yet containment is 
usually ensured by a combination of government forces and the intervention of 
peacekeepers (for example, the attempted coup in Cote d‟Ivoire in 2002 was only 
prevented by intervention French troops stationed in Abidjan).  Subsequently, prolonged 
periods of stalemate hold, punctuated by small scale fighting.  Rebel groups at this stage 
will tend to remain broadly committed to the initial ideological objective but a combination 
of impatience, the drying up of supplies, the recruitment of disparate volunteers and the 
gradual inclusion of foreign mercenaries into their ranks serve to dissipate ideological 
clarity and provoke attacks against civilians in order to pillage food and property.  Also, 
rebel groups will attempt to take control of resource rich areas in order to ensure continued 
funding for arms, equipment and general supplies.   
The later development is facilitated by the gradual emergence of the war economy, 
as established trading mechanisms are replaced by illicit networks operating across borders 
(by land, sea and air) and involving international criminal groups and companies dealing in 
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the illegal trading of weapons.  Also, rebel held areas might develop their own forms of 
governance and self-sustaining economies.  
These early stages of conflict will have massive humanitarian consequences typified 
by large flows of peoples - within the state‟s borders as internally displaced people or as 
refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries.  The sudden presence of large numbers of 
refugees in neighbouring countries places a great strain on regional stability. 
Also, in some instances conflict in countries may display a character, akin to the 
point reached here, from the outset.  Although, generally, initial causes may relate back to 
poor governance, poverty, grievances etc, the conflict may quickly assume a reasonably 
developed nature due to the presence of reconstituted rebel groups and mercenaries from 
other countries comprising the bulk of the fighters (e.g many Ivorian rebels in the west 
were former Taylor militia members thus issues of recruitment and development are not so 
relevant).  International community responses in such cases may be somewhat more 
coherent given high levels of preparedness if conflict was expected.   
 
Conflict Intensification 
 
Key Points: 
 Increased targeting of civilians 
 Atmosphere of impunity 
 Splintering of armed groups 
 Collusion between opposing belligerents possible 
 Battlefield complexity 
 War economy development and spread 
 
At this point, after the initial development and growth of rebel movements, the process 
becomes increasingly complex and can take various directions depending on specific 
country factors.  However, we can still discern some of the key developments that we 
would expect to see at this point.   
Most distressingly, civilians increasingly tend to become the primary targets of both 
rebel groups and government forces as widespread human rights abuses, looting, rape, 
summary killings, and massacres become a common feature of armed group tactics 
(reasons for this are explored in Section One).  Consequently, rebels significantly lose 
legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary civilians.  Faced with brutality from both rebel and 
government soldiers, civilians may be forced to form vigilante groups (the most notable 
example being the civil defence forces, or kamajors, of the Sierra Leone civil war).  Such 
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developments often serve to increase violence against civilians still further due to 
heightened levels of mistrust – for example, rebels or government forces will accuse 
civilians of being enemy collaborators leading to a situation in which even neutrality is 
taken to be evidence of opposition warranting punishment or execution.   
These developments take place in an atmosphere of impunity where continued 
conflict, for the perpetrators of these crimes, serves to postpone the date when they may be 
held accountable and the killing of civilians attains a modicum of rationality in the sense 
that they believe they are destroying the only credible evidence that may one day be used 
against them.  International humanitarian law thus loses its applicability in such a chaotic 
battlefield and an environment where most combatants are children with little knowledge 
of right and wrong, let alone the finer points of the Geneva conventions. 
As conflict intensifies, identity and ethnic tensions increase and this often leads to 
substantial rifts within rebel groups.  Such divisions often emerge as the prospect of 
obtaining power nears.  Minority factions within the broad rebel alliance fear exclusion by 
the leading ethnic group upon successful overthrow of the government and thus form break 
away groups intended to seize power for themselves (an excellent example of this being 
the formation of the LURD splinter group, MODEL, in early 2003 due primarily to fears of 
ethnic Mandingo domination at the expense of the Krahn).  This makes conflict resolution 
more difficult as peace deals have to be negotiated with a variety of belligerents, with a 
variety of interests. 
As the conflict intensifies we may well observe an increase in collaboration between 
soldiers and rebels thus further complicating the battlefield and blurring traditional 
distinctions during war.  This collusion may occur for a number of reasons: both groups 
have an economic interest in conflict prolongation which allows continued looting of 
civilians and exploitation of resources (peace is seen as a threat in this respect); contact 
between the two groups increases as trading in the spoils of war and defections occur more 
often; both groups often have a very similar social base and as such they share similar 
goals of „turning the tables‟ on their former masters; and finally they share the same 
underlying goal of simply trying to survive, thus both find attacking civilians less costly.  
For example, in the early 1990s in Sierra Leone there was an increasing trend towards 
government forces and rebel collusion and co-operation.  This took the form of 
government forces actively supplying rebels with arms and ammunitions (known as „sell 
game‟), disaffected unpaid soldiers joining the RUF, and the facilitation of rebel attacks in 
order to depopulate resource rich areas.  The growing complicity of government forces in 
abuses of civilians led to the growing use of the term „sobels‟ – soldiers by day, rebel by 
night (Keen, 2005).   
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Fighting at this stage is typified by hit and run tactics and attacks against civilians 
rather than direct confrontation between belligerents (such confrontations are typically 
confined to battles over resource rich areas or the control of strategic centres).  Often the 
country will be divided between rebel held and government areas, although the front line 
may be very fluid as occasional big pushes may be attempted but these often run out of 
steam and strategic positions change hands regularly because defenders will tend to yield 
positions if outnumbered.  This may not be the case where peacekeepers have intervened to 
separate the warring sides, however hit and run tactics will still be common. 
The war economy becomes deeply entrenched.  Any sanctions placed on arms sales 
and conflict fuelling resources are largely ineffective in preventing the continued supply of 
weapons to fighters bought in exchange for resources under rebel control such as 
diamonds, timber or cocoa brokered through scrupulous corporate entities operating behind 
the cover of front companies.  Control of resources by the rebels is initially carried out in 
order to continue the rebellion by buying arms, but increasingly, greed begins to take on a 
much greater casual significance for continued conflict – war becomes a means of personal 
gain and the distinction between criminality and insurgency becomes significantly blurred.  
In addition to that, it is also serves as a vehicle for empowerment – the process of throwing 
off social chains and exacting revenge.  War develops its own new logic whereby 
belligerents (both rebel and state elements) see a vested interest in maintaining a 
simmering conflict for economic exploitation – war becomes self-financing. The initial 
motivations may still exist and are still used as recruiting propaganda, but at this point 
objectives are much more diffuse.   
Intimately linked to the above, the importance of borders becomes pronounced as 
trade in arms and illegal goods increases, mercenaries move freely over borders to carry 
out there trade wherever conflict emerges, large population movements cause disruption in 
neighbouring countries and fighting spreads over borders into neighbouring states.  Porous 
borders allow the dynamics of conflict to develop and intensify. 
International involvement will tend to increase as the fighting intensifies (particularly 
within the humanitarian community) yet concerted efforts to end the conflict only tend to 
emerge when the situation becomes extremely desperate or Western national interest is 
seen to be in direct danger.  An interesting development that may be observed at this stage 
is the hiring of professional foreign mercenaries, otherwise known as Private Military 
Companies, by the government to drive back insurgents and recapture strategic locations.  
For example, in 1995 the Sierra Leone government contracted the South African firm 
„Executive Outcomes‟ to drive rebels from the capital and recapture diamond mines 
(Singer, 2004).  This comes at great expense to the government and whilst it may provide 
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temporary respite and a short-term cash injection due to renewed control of resource rich 
areas, it is by no means a lasting solution as rebels will often recapture those areas once 
government funds dry up and the mercenaries leave.  Also, ordinary civilians will rarely 
benefit, as mercenary operations will be focused on key strategic areas which causes rebels 
to be pushed out into civilian areas.   
 
Conflict Perpetuation and Renewal – ‘The Conflict Trap’  
 
Key Points: 
 Certain factors serve to perpetuate conflict 
 Complex processes of feedback and renewal  
 Example of war economy in conflict perpetuation 
 
Once the key elements, and the regionalisation, of the conflict have become entrenched we 
can expect to see a number of possible developments.  As the red boxes in the conflict 
chart reveal, many factors serve to reinforce, and feedback into, each other resulting in a 
significant perpetuation and renewal of conflict.  It is not necessary to go over all the key 
factors again but to illustrate the point, let us consider the issue of the war economy and 
reveal how this one aspect of war feeds into and perpetuates cycles of conflict. 
As stated above, the war economy largely supplants legitimate economic transfers 
and processes.  The economic exploitation of natural resources by the government, 
warlords, rebel groups, the armed forces, foreign companies and even Civil Defence 
Forces affects many other conflict renewal factors.  The widely reported trade in conflict 
diamonds for example, that is prevalent throughout the region, is a prime source of rebel 
strength (although it must be stated that the wealth created by this trade rarely finds its way 
down to rank and file rebels).  Importantly, government involvement in economic 
exploitation perpetuates poor governance through continued corrupt practices and lack of 
investment in much needed social services.  This, combined with increased widespread 
poverty resultant from the workings of the war economy, feeds back into the grievances 
that generated conflict in the first instance.  Also, exiled warlords can, given the lack of 
effective controls, continue to influence the course of the conflict by supplying arms to 
militias through proxies embedded in illicit trade networks.   
The prospect of personal enrichment fuels further recruitment into rebel forces and 
provides a strong incentive for armed groups to prolong the conflict so they can continue 
accumulating wealth with relative impunity.  Looting becomes widespread and leads to 
random attacks against civilians which again feeds into widespread grievances.  
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Simultaneously, the discipline, cohesion and war fighting effectiveness of rebel groups is 
undermined by individual or small group economic motive thus making a final rebel 
victory less achievable whilst hampering peace negotiations because of command and 
control issues in both rebel and government forces.  The cross border illicit trade, upon 
which the war economy largely depends, causes massive disruptions to the livelihoods of 
those living in the border regions and many civilians may be forced into becoming 
involved in micro economic illicit trading with rebels in order to survive.  This serves to 
deepen and widen the extent and reach of the war economy.   
Foreign aid can unwittingly play into the workings of the war economy and help 
sustain conflict.  In many respects aid can reinforce issues of exclusion and exploitation.  
Aid to prop up governments who are known to have committed gross human rights abuses 
and been involved in violent extortion not only represented a form of silent approval of 
such practices, thus compounding cultures of impunity, but also allows those governments 
to divert resources to purchase arms for soldiers committing the crimes.  Also, the prospect 
of continued aid flowing into the country can serve as another incentive for perpetuating 
conflict, as rebels will steal relief provided to civilians and demand protection money from 
convoys.  The fact that aid often does not reach the most needy may exacerbate grievances 
of exclusion – rebels are often neglected in this respect, which can prompt further attacks 
against food stores, civilians and relief convoys. 
This, along with the spread of fighting over borders (often caused by militias in 
search of further resources to exploit), can constitute significant factors in causing or 
contributing to region-wide insecurity, destabilisation and conflict, and, in turn, makes 
successful resolution of the conflict less probable.  These are just some of the ways in 
which various factors serve to feed into and perpetuate conflict.   
 
Conflict Resolution and Potential for Relapse  
 
Key Points: 
 The fragility of ‘final’ resolutions 
 High potential for renewal of violence 
 Rebel Groups not entirely demobilised 
 Continuing impact of war economy 
 Spill over of violence 
 
The modern history of the region warns us to be sceptical of apparent „final‟ resolutions to 
any given conflict, and in fact, the elusiveness of stable and accountable governments has 
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been a prime cause for further grievances and desperation amongst the population.  The 
history of the region is littered with dashed hopes.  Countless would-be leaders have 
claimed they alone hold the formula for peace, yet upon assuming power, prove no better, 
or are indeed far worse, than their predecessors. 
Concerted and resolute international engagement can only be expected when: civilian 
casualties have reached levels that provoke frequent media attention and widespread 
international concern; the humanitarian situation has become so dire as to endanger 
international peace and security and aid supply for displaced persons and refugees is 
unsustainable; and the conflict has reached a level of intensity that cannot be ignored.  
Upon the cessation of hostilities the international community bus will come rolling into 
town driven by the United Nations and packed full with peacekeepers, technocrats, and 
post-conflict specialists.  The now almost standard blueprint for post-conflict 
reconstruction will be implemented consisting of such elements as security establishment, 
the establishment of a transitional government, judicial reform and much more.  The 
culmination of this mammoth effort is usually the holding of free and fair elections to vote 
in a new democratically elected government, after which engagement can wind down 
leading to eventual withdrawal.   
There is a prevailing, and worrying, tendency to see elections as the end of the 
process of conflict resolution and a final cure for conflict.  This optimism is misplaced.  
History has shown that elections themselves by no means guarantee good governance, 
even if conducted under international scrutiny (for instance, Taylor was democratically 
elected in 1997 in elections declared free and fair by international observers).  Corruption, 
extortion and a proclivity towards authoritarianism are deeply ingrained in the history of 
the states considered in this report and civilians are highly sceptical of government in 
general following years of misrule and destitution.  Good governance is not something that 
can be instituted over night – it must be developed and fostered over many years and it will 
only come to be trusted after a proven record in delivering basic services.   
The danger remains that when the UN withdraws the most likely outcome will be a 
resumption of „politics-as-plunder‟, particularly when many government officials have 
murky pasts and ties to former militias.  For example, in Sierra Leone, although much 
progress has been made, worryingly little has been done to tackle poor education and 
unemployment, as Ellis states, many former fighters would not hesitate to take up arms 
again at the first opportunity (Ellis, 2005).  The development of stable governmental 
structures is made significantly more difficult given the vast amount of problems facing 
states emerging from brutal conflict.  Even western governments, based upon established 
constitutions created centuries ago, occasionally teeter on the brink of collapse despite 
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enjoying long periods of peace.  The significant problems facing post-conflict states, 
considered below, make failure all the more possible – compounding the already tortuously 
difficult transition to sustainable peace. 
  
(i) Rebel groups not entirely demobilised.   
 
Even following substantial efforts at DDR of rebel groups, should fighting resume, former 
rebel groups may re-emerge in a slightly altered fashion, perhaps operating under a 
different pseudonym, but comprising familiar elements (for example, the Liberian rebel 
group, LURD, was largely comprised of reconstituted ULIMO forces which fought in 
Liberia‟s first civil war).  This clearly reveals the inadequacy of previous attempts at DDR 
(which were often under-funded) and shows that even after the stated „successful 
completion‟ of disarmament and demobilisation, many fighters remain unemployed and 
not fully reintegrated into normal society.  For many young people the only trade they 
know is killing; if peace does not adequately provide them with an alternative, what is to 
prevent them from returning to war.  As mentioned, for many young men, war provides 
more opportunities than peace.  Rapid remobilisation of rebel forces, should the situation 
deteriorate, is highly probable given that the basic loose structures of rebel groups remain, 
potential fighters are in abundance and weapons still circulate illegally throughout the 
region.   
 
(ii) Continuing impact of war economy.   
 
The complex structures and mechanisms that constitute war economies will not, 
unfortunately, disappear once a peace agreement has been signed.  War economies must be 
dismantled carefully with regard to all the stakeholders in violence.  This process will be 
significantly impeded by „spoilers‟ of peace processes who see no economic benefits in 
peace, and so wish to foster the conditions that sustain conflict.  Alternatively, peace 
processes may be hijacked by former faction leaders who demand positions in the 
transitional government, recognising the potential for personal aggrandisement and 
exploitation through influence.  Also, aspects of the peace process may in fact serve to 
stimulate illicit trading and create a cycle of demand for weapons as a result of insufficient 
planning.  A curious process noted in the region has been that of ex-combatants buying 
arms in one country, moving across borders to hand weapons in as part of UN disarmament 
initiatives, in return for which they receive a cash reward which is over and above the 
original cost of the weapon, the resultant profit from which is used to purchase more arms.  
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Also, natural resources continue to pose substantial problems in post-conflict states; all 
efforts must be made to ensure their protection, regulation and management.  This is 
particularly important where rebels retain control of key resource areas further fuelling 
illicit cross-border trading.   
 
(iii) Spill-over of violence.   
 
Another potential for renewed violence, even after supposedly comprehensive peace 
settlements, is the possibility of insecurity in neighbouring countries spilling over and 
causing significant destabilisation.  Massive influxes of refugees can potentially place too 
great a strain on host countries attempting to resolve their own serious problems.  Also, 
perhaps more destabilising is the impact of spill over of actual violence, which has 
frequently occurred in the history of the region. 
 
Prospects for the Region 
 
Based on the findings of this report, the prospects for the future are mixed.  Currently in 
the region there is a tentative calm.  Although small-scale violence persists, the large 
United Nations peacekeeping presence in the region (albeit unevenly distributed, with 
troops rapidly drawing down in Sierra Leone, some 15,000 troops present in Liberia, 
around 10,000 – French and UN – in Cote d‟Ivoire and none in Guinea) ensures full-scale 
conflict is contained.  Under such tutelage the transition to peace is making slow but real 
progress.  Whilst the international presence in the region remains at such high levels there 
is little reason to expect a return to full-scale violence.  There is optimism and hope that the 
fighting is over and normal life can gradually resume.  However, enormous challenges 
remain.  The UN presence creates a false perception of security that clouds the serious and 
pervasive underlying problems which remain unresolved.    
Unfortunately, the UN does not have unlimited resources and undoubtedly new 
conflicts will emerge that shift its emphasis elsewhere.  Thus, their missions are always 
shadowed by timetables for withdrawal and exit strategies.  Gradually, the various 
missions will wind down and move on.  Thus, from a broad perspective – given that some 
of these countries have experienced decades of exploitation and war - the international 
community‟s efforts represent only short-term palliatives for what are deeply entrenched 
problems.  Thus, we must distinguish between short-term prospects and medium to long-
term prospects. 
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The analysis of conflict causes and dynamics outlined in this report reveals the 
primary ways in which conflict can emerge and develop.  Thus, while the realities of 
progress are currently obscured by the international presence, in order to determine 
prospects for the region one has to assess how far the underlying causes and facilitating 
factors have been resolved.  Many of the conditions for conflict can be identified 
throughout the region.  The causes and facilitators still exist and thus the potential for 
conflict in the medium to long-term remains a real possibility.  History has shown that 
when a lethal combination of factors converges conflict can easily ignite.  Essentially, 
conflict may emerge when the following factors are present: primary cause and underlying 
grievance (for example, continued corruption, poverty, high levels of unemployment, 
youth alienation); conflict facilitating factors (warlords, porous borders, arms supplies, 
regional instability, foreign support); a lack of international attention (as concern turns 
elsewhere and resources dry up); and usually some form of spark (e.g, an initial rebel 
incursion or political assassination).   
It is not simply pessimistic or fatalistic, but realistic, to suggest that the potential for 
renewed conflict is high in the medium to long term.  It is not sufficient to argue that the 
people of the region are tired of conflict and thus the likelihood of its recurrence is 
diminished.  No doubt the sentiment is true for the vast majority but, as this report has 
shown, it takes only a small minority to upset tentative balances and spread disorder.  This 
report has also revealed that when conflict does emerge, it assumes a character that defies 
traditional interpretations of war.  Conflict becomes locked in cycles of perpetuation and 
renewal.  The humanitarian consequences of the outbreak and development of conflict in 
the region are massive and are typified by large loss of life, population displacement, gross 
violations of human rights and also, almost incomprehensible psychological trauma.   
Ultimately, for international actors engaged in the region, a sound understanding of 
conflict dynamics is essential for three central reasons.  Firstly, it will encourage initiatives 
and programmes that effectively target the primary causes and facilitators of conflict thus 
minimising the potential for its occurrence.  Secondly, it will allow more effective 
preparation for possible humanitarian emergencies based on an understanding of when and 
how they might emerge.  Third, in the event of renewed conflict, it will allow engagement 
that is sensitive to the complexity of the context in which operations take place.
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Section Three – Country Specific Backgrounders 
 
Liberia 
 
 
 
Capital:  Monrovia 
Population:  3.6 million. 
Key resources:  timber, rubber, iron ore, gold, diamonds. 
Area: 99,067 sq km (38,250 sq miles)  
Languages: English, 29 African languages belonging to the Mande, Kwa or Mel 
linguistic groups  
Major religions: Christianity, Islam, indigenous beliefs  
Life expectancy: 41 years (men), 43 years (women)  
Monetary unit: 1 Liberian dollar (L$) = 100 cents  
GNI per capita: US $110   
 
Overview: 
A bloody coup mounted by Samuel Doe in 1980 marked the end of dominance by the 
minority Americo-Liberians, who had ruled since independence in 1847, but heralded a 
period of instability.  
By the late 1980s, arbitrary rule and economic collapse culminated in civil war when 
Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) militia entered northern 
Liberia from Cote d‟Ivoire in December 1989, overran much of the countryside and 
entered the capital in June 1990. In August the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) sent a peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, to protect Monrovia, but the 
Doe dictatorship collapsed and he was murdered by a rebel faction in September. 
Fighting intensified as the rebels splintered and battled each other, the Liberian army and 
West African peacekeepers. The state went into freefall and collapsed.  In 1995 a peace 
agreement was signed, leading to a disarmament programme and the election of Mr 
Taylor as president in 1997.  
The respite was brief, with anti-government fighting breaking out in the north in 1999 led 
by the LURD rebel group. Mr Taylor accused Guinea of supporting the rebellion. 
Meanwhile Ghana, Nigeria and others accused Mr Taylor of backing rebels in Sierra 
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Leone. Another anti-Taylor rebel group, MODEL, emerged in the east of Liberia in 
spring 2003. 
After bitter fighting throughout the summer, matters came to a head in August 2003 when 
Mr Taylor - under international pressure to quit and hemmed in by rebels - stepped down 
and went into exile in Nigeria. The National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) 
was sworn in later that year under the leadership of the businessman, Gyude Bryant, to 
steer the country towards elections. However, the NTGL proved to be extensively corrupt 
and largely ineffective. 
Around 250,000 people were killed in Liberia's civil war and many thousands more fled 
the fighting. The conflict left the country in economic ruin and overrun with weapons. 
Corruption is rife and unemployment and illiteracy are endemic.  
The UN maintains some 15,000 soldiers in Liberia. It is the organisation's most expensive 
peacekeeping operation.  Elections were held peacefully in October 2005.  The second 
round of the presidential election is due to be held on 8 November and will be contested 
between George Weah and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf.  
(Source: BBC, FCO) 
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Liberia Chronology 
 
Early days  
  
1847 - Constitution modelled on that of the USA drawn up.  
  
1847 - July - Liberia becomes independent.  
  
1917 - Liberia declares war on Germany, giving the Allies a base in West Africa.  
  
1926 - Firestone Tire and Rubber Company opens rubber plantation on land granted by government. Rubber 
production becomes backbone of economy.  
  
1936 - Forced-labour practices abolished.  
  
1943 - William Tubman elected president.  
  
1944 - Government declares war on the Axis powers.  
  
1951 - May - Women and indigenous property owners vote in the presidential election for the first time.  
  
1958 - Racial discrimination outlawed.  
  
1971 - Tubman dies and is succeeded by William Tolbert Jr.  
  
1974 - Government accepts aid from the Soviet Union for the first time.  
  
1978 - Liberia signs trade agreement with the European Economic Community.  
  
1979 - More than 40 people are killed in riots following a proposed increase in the price of rice.  
 
Instability  
  
1980 - Master Sergeant Samuel Doe stages military coup. Tolbert is murdered and 13 of his aides are 
publicly executed. A People‟s Redemption Council headed by Doe suspends constitution and assumes full 
powers.  
  
1984 - Doe‟s regime allows return of political parties following pressure from the United States and other 
creditors.  
  
1985 - Doe wins presidential election.  
 
Taylor ’s uprising  
 45 
  
1989 - National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor begins an uprising against the 
government.  
  
1990 - Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sends peacekeeping force. Doe is executed 
by a splinter group of the NPFL.  
  
1991 - ECOWAS and the NPFL agree to disarm and set up an Interim Government of National Unity.  
  
1992 - The NPFL launches an all-out assault on West African peacekeepers in Monrovia, the latter respond 
by bombing NPFL positions outside the capital and pushing the NPFL back into the countryside.  
 
Tentative cease-fire  
  
1993 - The warring factions draw up a plan for a National Transitional Government and a cease-fire, but this 
fails to materialise and fighting resumes.  
  
1994 - The warring factions agree on a timetable for disarmament and the setting up of a joint Council of 
State.  
  
1995 - Peace agreement signed.  
  
1996 April - Factional fighting resumes and spreads to Monrovia.  
  
1996 August - West African peacekeepers initiate disarmament programme, clear landmines and reopen 
roads, allowing refugees to return.  
  
1997 July - Presidential and legislative elections held. Charles Taylor wins a landslide and his National 
Patriotic Party wins a majority of seats in the National Assembly. International observers declare the 
elections free and fair.  
 
Border fighting  
  
1999 January - Ghana and Nigeria accuse Liberia of supporting Revolutionary United Front rebels in Sierra 
Leone. Britain and the US threaten to suspend aid to Liberia.  
  
1999 April - Rebel forces thought to have come from Guinea attack town of Voinjama. Fighting displaces 
more than 25,000 people.  
  
1999 September - Guinea accuses Liberian forces of entering its territory and attacking border villages. 
   
2000 September - Liberian forces launch “massive offensive” against rebels in the north. Liberia accuses 
Guinean troops of shelling border villages.  
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2001 February - Liberian government says Sierra Leonean rebel leader Sam Bockarie, also known as 
Mosquito, has left the country.  
  
2001 May - UN Security Council re-imposes arms embargo to punish Taylor for trading weapons for 
diamonds from rebels in Sierra Leone.  
  
2002 January - More than 50,000 Liberians and Sierra Leonean refugees flee fighting. In February Taylor 
declares a state of emergency.  
  
2002 September - President Taylor lifts an eight-month state of emergency and a ban on political rallies, 
citing a reduced threat from rebels.  
 
Rebel offensives  
  
2003 March - Rebels open several battlefronts and advance to within 10km of Monrovia. Tens of thousands 
of people displaced by fighting.  
  
2003 June - Talks in Ghana aimed at ending rebellion overshadowed by indictment accusing President Taylor 
of war crimes over his alleged backing of rebels in Sierra Leone.  
  
2003 July - Fighting intensifies; rebels battle for control of Monrovia. Several hundred people are killed. 
West African regional group ECOWAS agrees to provide peacekeepers.  
  
2003 August - Nigerian peacekeepers arrive. Charles Taylor leaves Liberia after handing power to his deputy 
Moses Blah. US troops arrive. Interim government, rebels sign peace accord in Ghana. Gyude Bryant chosen 
to head interim administration from October.  
  
2003 Sept/Oct - US forces pull out. UN launches major peacekeeping mission (UNMIL), deploying 
thousands of troops.  
  
2003 October - Gyude Bryant sworn in as head of state.  
  
2003 December - UN peacekeepers begin to disarm former combatants, deploy in rebel territory outside 
Monrovia.  
  
2004 February - International donors pledge more than USD500m in reconstruction aid.  
  
2004 March - UN Security Council votes to freeze assets of Charles Taylor.  
  
2004 October - Riots in Monrovia leave 16 people dead; UN says former combatants were behind violence.  
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2004 November – UN announces successful disarmament of over 100,000 former combatants and the 
disarmament and demobilisation phase of DDR comes to a close.  
  
2005 October – Presidential and Parliamentary elections held – Presidential Candidate George Weah leading 
after first round.  The second round will be held on 8 November. 
(Source for Chronology: Wiess, 2005) 
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Sierra Leone 
 
 
 
 
 
Capital: Freetown  
Population: 5.3 million 
Key resources: Diamonds, rutile, cocoa, coffee, fish 
Area: 71,740 sq km (27,699 sq miles)  
Major languages: English, Krio (Creole language derived from English) and a range of 
African languages  
Major religions: Islam, indigenous beliefs, Christianity  
Life expectancy: 39 years (men), 42 years (women) 
Monetary unit: 1 Leone = 100 cents  
GNI per capita: US $200  
 
Overview: 
The civil war in Sierra Leone began in March 1991 when a small number of fighters called 
the revolutionary United Front (RUF) attacked Sierra leone from Liberia.  An Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) comprising mutinous members of the Sierra Leone 
Army overthrew the government in May 1997.  The RUF accepted the AFRC‟s invitation 
to join the new junta, but the international community overwhelmingly supported the 
exiled government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.  Kabbah was reinstalled with the aid of West 
African Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) troops in 1998.   
The AFRC and RUF conducted a siege of Freetown in January 1999 that resulted in more 
than 5,000 deaths and in May 2000 some 500 UN peacekeepers were taken hostage who 
later rescued by British soldiers.  Undermined by the UN's ban on diamond exports, the 
RUF began disarming in May 2001 after the deployment of UN peacekeepers (UNAMSIL) 
but the civil war did not officially end until February 2002.  Kabbah was eventually re-
elected in May 2002. 
A lasting feature of the conflict, which left some 50,000 dead, was the atrocities committed 
by the rebels, whose trademark was to hack off the hands of their victims.  
A UN-backed war crimes court has been set up to try those, from both sides, who bear the 
"greatest responsibility" for the wartime brutalities.  
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Sierra Leone also faces the challenge of reconstruction. The problems of poverty, tribal 
rivalry and official corruption that caused the war are far from over.  
The 70,000 former combatants who were disarmed and rehabilitated after the war have 
swollen the ranks of the many young people seeking employment.  
Sierra Leone is rich in diamonds. The trade in illicit gems, known as "blood diamonds" for 
their role in funding conflicts, perpetuated the civil war. The government has attempted to 
crack down on cross-border diamond trafficking.  
(Source: BBC, International Alert, FCO)  
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Sierra Leone Chronology  
 
Early Days 
  
1787 - British abolitionists and philanthropists establish a settlement in Freetown for repatriated and rescued 
slaves.  
  
1808 - Freetown settlement becomes a crown colony.  
  
1896 - Britain sets up a protectorate over the Freetown hinterland.  
  
1954 - Sir Milton Margai, leader of the Sierra Leone People‟s Party, is appointed chief minister.  
 
One-party rule  
  
1961 - Sierra Leone becomes independent.  
  
1967 - Military coup deposes Premier Siaka Stevens‟s government.  
  
1968 - Siaka Stevens returns to power at the head of a civilian government following another military coup.  
  
1971 - Sierra Leone is declared a republic and Stevens becomes executive president.  
  
1978 - New constitution proclaims Sierra Leone a one-party state with the All People‟s Congress as the sole 
legal party.  
  
1985 - Major-General Joseph Saidu Momoh becomes president following Stevens‟s retirement.  
  
1987 - Momoh declares state of economic emergency.  
 
War and coups  
  
1991 - Start of civil war. Former army corporal Foday Sankoh and his Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
rebels begin campaign against President Momoh, capturing towns on border with Liberia and taking control 
of Kailahun.  
  
1991 September - New constitution providing for a multiparty system adopted.  
  
1992 - President Joseph Momoh ousted in military coup led by Captain Valentine Strasser and the NPRC. 
Under international pressure, Strasser announces plans for the first multiparty elections since 1967.  
  
1996 January - Strasser ousted in military coup led by his defence minister, Brigadier Julius Maada Bio.  
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1996 - Ahmad Tejan Kabbah elected president in February, signs peace accord with Sankoh‟s rebels in 
November.  
  
1997 Peace deal unravels. President Kabbah deposed in May by coalition of army officers led by Major-
General Paul Koroma and members of the RUF; Koroma suspends the constitution, bans demonstrations and 
abolishes political parties; Kabbah flees to Guinea to mobilise international support.  
  
1997 July - The Commonwealth suspends Sierra Leone.  
  
1997 October - The United Nations Security Council imposes sanctions against Sierra Leone, barring the 
supply of arms and petroleum products. A British mercenary company, Sandline, nonetheless supplies 
“logistical support”, including rifles, to Kabbah allies.  
  
1998 February - The Nigerian-led West African intervention force ECOMOG storms Freetown and drives 
rebels out.  
  
1998 March - Kabbah makes a triumphant return to Freetown amid scenes of public rejoicing.  
  
1999 January - Rebels backing RUF leader Foday Sankoh seize parts of Freetown from ECOMOG. After 
weeks of bitter fighting they are driven out, leaving behind 5,000 dead and a devastated city.  
 
UN intervention  
  
1999 May - A ceasefire is greeted with cautious optimism in Freetown. In hospitals and amputee camps, 
victims of rebel atrocities express hope that eight years of civil war may soon be over.  
  
1999 July - Six weeks of talks in the Togolese capital, Lomé, result in a peace agreement, under which the 
rebels receive posts in government and assurances they will not be prosecuted for war crimes.  
  
1999 November/December - UN troops arrive to police the peace agreement - but one rebel leader, Sam 
Bokarie, says they are not welcome. Meanwhile, ECOMOG troops are attacked outside Freetown.  
  
2000 April/May - UN forces come under attack in the east of the country. First 50, then several hundred UN 
troops are abducted.  
  
2000 May - Rebels close in on Freetown; 800 British paratroopers sent to Freetown to evacuate British 
citizens and to help secure the airport for UN peacekeepers; rebel leader Foday Sankoh captured.  
  
2000 August - Eleven British soldiers taken hostage by a renegade militia group called the West Side Boys.  
 
Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration  
  
2000 September - British forces mount successful operation to rescue remaining UK hostages.  
 53 
  
2001 January - Government postpones presidential and parliamentary elections - set for February and March 
- for six months because of continuing insecurity, which it said made it impossible to conduct free and fair 
elections nationwide.  
  
2001 March - UN troops for the first time begin to deploy peacefully in rebel-held territory.  
  
2001 May - Disarmament of rebels begins, and British-trained Sierra Leone army starts deploying in rebel-
held areas.  
  
2002 January - War declared over. UN mission says disarmament of 45,000 fighters complete. The UN and 
the Government of Sierra Leone sign the agreement that establishes a Special Court to try war crimes.  
  
2002 May - Kabbah wins a landslide victory in elections. His Sierra Leone People‟s Party (SLPP) secures a 
majority in parliament.  
  
2002 July - British troops leave Sierra Leone after their two-year mission to help end the civil war.  
  
2003 July - Rebel leader Foday Sankoh dies of natural causes in prison while waiting to be tried for war 
crimes.  
  
2003 August - President Kabbah tells the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that he had no say over 
operations of pro-government militias during the war.  
  
2004 February - Disarmament and rehabilitation of more than 70,000 civil war combatants officially 
completed.  
 
War crimes trials  
  
2004 March - UN-backed war crimes tribunal (Special Court for Sierra Leone ) opens courthouse to try those 
people “who bear the greatest responsibility for war crimes” committed after 30 November 1996.  
  
2004 May - First local elections in more than three decades.  
  
2004 June - War crimes trials begin.  
  
2004 September - UN hands over control of security in capital to local forces.  
 
2005 August – UN Security Council authorises opening of a UN assistance mission in 2006, to follow 
expected departure of peacekeepers in December 2005. 
 
(Source for Chronology: Wiess, 2005) 
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Guinea 
 
 
 
 
 
Capital: Conakry 
Population: 8.8 million 
Key resources: Bauxite, alumina, gold, diamonds, coffee, fish, agricultural products 
Area: 245,857 sq km (94,926 sq miles)  
Major languages: French, various tribal languages  
Major religions: Islam, Christianity, indigenous beliefs  
Life expectancy: 53 years (men), 54 years (women) 
Monetary unit: 1 Guinean franc = 100 centimes  
GNI per capita: US $460 
 
Overview: 
After independence in 1958 Guinea severed ties with France and turned to the Soviet 
Union. The first president, Ahmed Sekou Toure, pursued a revolutionary socialist agenda 
and crushed political opposition. Tens of thousands of people disappeared, or were tortured 
and executed, during his 26-year regime.  
Economic mismanagement and repression culminated in riots in 1977. These led to some 
relaxation of state control of the economy.  
But it was only after the death in 1984 of Ahmed Sekou Toure, and the seizure of power by 
Lansana Conte and other officers, that the socialist experiment was abandoned - without 
reversing poverty.  Conte essentially turned the state into a machine for pillage and self-
enrichment. 
In 2000 Guinea became home to up to half a million refugees fleeing fighting in Sierra 
Leone and Liberia. This increased the strain on its economy and generated suspicion and 
ethnic tension, amid mutual accusations of attempts at destabilisation and border attacks.  
Acute economic problems, the inability of the government to provide services, instability 
among its neighbours and uncertainty over a successor (a military coup is a strong 
possibility) to its ailing authoritarian president have prompted the International Crisis 
Group, to warn that Guinea risks becoming “West Africa‟s next failed state".  
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The municipal elections scheduled for December 2005 will be a good test of Guinean 
democratic reform.  Failure to hold credible and fair elections could make the presidential 
succession disastrous.  
(Sources: BBC, ICG, FCO) 
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Guinea Chronology 
 
Early days  
  
1891 - France declares Guinea to be a colony, separate from Senegal.  
  
1898 - Defeat of resistance to French occupation led by Samory Toure, great-grandfather of future President 
Ahmed Sekou Toure.  
  
1906 - Guinea becomes part of French West African Federation.  
  
1952 - Ahmed Sekou Toure becomes secretary-general of the Democratic Party of Guinea.  
 
Independence 
  
1958 October - Guinea becomes independent, with Ahmed Sekou Toure as president.  
  
1965 - Sekou Toure breaks off relations with France after accusing it of plotting to oust him.  
  
1984 March - Sekou Toure dies.  
  
1984 April - Lansana Conté and Diarra Traore seize power in bloodless coup. Conté becomes president while 
Traore is installed as prime minister.  
  
1985 - Attempted coup organised by Traore following his demotion to education minister.  
  
1990 - Constitution paving the way for civilian government is adopted.  
 
Democracy without peace  
  
1993 - First multiparty elections are held; Conté confirmed in office.  
  
1995 - Conté‟s Party of Unity and Progress wins 71 of the National Assembly‟s 114 seats.  
  
1996 - Some 30 people are killed and presidential palace set on fire as 25 percent of Guinea‟s armed forces 
mutiny over low pay and poor conditions.  
  
2000 September - Alpha Conde, leader of opposition Guinean People‟s Rally, is sentenced to five years in 
prison for endangering state security and recruiting foreign mercenaries. He is pardoned in May 2001.  
  
2000 September - incursions by rebels in border regions with Liberia and Sierra Leone which claim more 
than 1,000 lives and cause massive population displacement. The government accuses Liberia, the Sierra 
Leonean United Revolutionary Front (RUF) rebel group, Burkina Faso and former Guinean army mutineers 
of trying to destabilise Guinea.  
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2001 February - Government deploys attack helicopters to the front-line in its fight with rebels.  
 
Referendum  
  
2001 November - Official results show constitutional referendum, boycotted by opposition, endorses 
President Conté‟s proposal to extend presidential term from five to seven years. Critics accuse Conté of 
trying to stay in power for life.  
  
2002 March - Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia agree on measures to secure mutual borders and to tackle 
insurgency.  
  
2003 November - Opposition leader Jean-Marie Dore detained, subsequently released, after saying President 
Conté is too ill to contest December‟s presidential election.  
  
2003 December - President Conté wins a third term in elections boycotted by the opposition.  
  
2004 April - Prime Minister Lounseny Fall resigns while visiting the US.  
  
2005 January - President Conté survives what security officials say is an assassination attempt. Shots were 
fired as his motorcade passed through the capital.  
 
2005 December – municipal elections to be held. 
(Source for Chronology: Wiess, 2005) 
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Côte d’Ivoire 
 
 
 
 
 
Capital: Yamoussoukro 
Population: 17.1m  
Key resources: Cocoa, coffee, tropical woods, petroleum, cotton, bananas, pineapples, 
palm oil 
Area: 322,462 sq km (124,503 sq miles)  
Major languages: French, indigenous languages  
Major religions: Islam, Christianity, indigenous beliefs  
Life expectancy: 45 years (men), 47 years (women) (UN)  
Monetary unit: 1 CFA (Communaute Financiere Africaine) franc = 100 centimes  
GNI per capita: US $770 
 
Overview: 
For more than three decades after independence under the leadership of its first president, 
Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Ivory Coast was conspicuous for its religious and ethnic 
harmony. Its economy was among the most developed on the continent.  
All this ended when the late Robert Guei led a coup which toppled Felix Houphouet-
Boigny's successor, Henri Bedie, in 1999.  
Mr Bedie fled, but not before planting the seeds of ethnic discord by trying to stir up 
xenophobia against Muslim northerners, including his main rival, Alassane Ouattara.  
This theme was also adopted by Mr Guei, who had Alassane Ouattara banned from the 
presidential election in 2000 because of his foreign parentage, and by the only serious 
contender allowed to run against Mr Guei, Laurent Gbagbo.  
When Mr Gbagbo replaced Robert Guei after he was deposed in a popular uprising in 
2000, violence replaced xenophobia. Scores of Mr Ouattara's supporters were killed after 
their leader called for new elections.  
In September 2002 a troop mutiny, during which Guei was killed, escalated into a full-
scale rebellion led by the Patriotic Movement of Cote d‟Ivoire (MPCI). After failing to 
take Abidjan the rebels retreated to the city of Bouake.  The group declared a ceasefire on 
17 October 2002, however, in November two other rebel groups emerged and seized cities 
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in the western region.  Finally, in January 2003 the Lome ceasefire agreement was signed 
and was followed by the Linas-Marcoussis accord which agreed upon the creation of a 
power sharing government to include representatives of the rebels who were by now united 
under the umbrella name „Force Nouvelles‟.   
There has been occasional violence along the cease-fire line and confidence in the peace 
process has been low on all sides. Peacekeepers patrol the buffer zone which separates the 
rebel-held north and the government-controlled south. Political efforts to reunite the nation 
have so far failed.  
Elections planned for 30 October were postponed after Gbagbo invoked a law which he 
said allowed him to stay in office and the UN confirmed free and fair elections would not 
be possible.  The African Union and UN have recommended that Gbagbo should only 
remain in office for a maximum of one year and that he appoints a new Prime Minister 
acceptable to all parties.  The Forces Nouvelles want their leader, Guillaume Soro, to be 
named as Prime Minister.  Gbagbo insists elections will be held before the end of the 12-
month deadline. 
(Source: BBC, FCO, ICG) 
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Cote d’Ivoire Chronology 
 
Early days  
  
1842 - France imposes protectorate over coastal zone.  
  
1893 - Côte d‟Ivoire made into a colony.  
  
1904 - Côte d‟Ivoire becomes part of the French Federation of West Africa.  
  
1944 - Felix Houphouët-Boigny, later to become the first president, founds a union of African farmers, which 
develops into the inter-territorial African Democratic Rally and its Ivorian section, the Côte d‟Ivoire 
Democratic Party.  
  
1958 - Côte d‟Ivoire becomes a republic within the French Community.  
 
Independence 
  
1960 - France grants independence under President Felix Houphouët-Boigny. He holds power until he dies in 
1993.  
  
1990 - Opposition parties legalised; Houphouët-Boigny wins Côte d‟Ivoire ‟s first multiparty presidential 
election, beating Laurent Gbagbo of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI).  
  
1993 - Henri Konan Bédié becomes president following the death of Houphouët-Boigny.  
  
1995 October - Bédié re-elected in a ballot that is boycotted by opposition parties in protest at restrictions 
imposed on their candidates.  
  
1999 - July - Alassane Ouattara, a Muslim, leaves job at International Monetary Fund and returns to run for 
president in 2000; his plan to challenge Bédié splits country along ethnic and religious lines. Opponents say 
he is national of Burkina Faso, not Côte d‟Ivoire.  
 
Coup 
  
1999 - Bédié overthrown in military coup led by Robert Guei. Bédié flees to France.  
  
2000 October - Guei proclaims himself president after announcing he has won presidential elections, but is 
forced to flee in the wake of a popular uprising against his perceived rigging of the poll.  
  
2000 October - Laurent Gbagbo, believe d to be the real winner in the presidential election, is proclaimed 
president. Opposition leader Alassane Outtara, excluded from running in the poll, calls for a fresh election.  
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2000 October - Fighting erupts between Gbagbo‟s mainly southern Christian supporters and followers of 
Outtara, who are mostly Muslims from the north.  
  
2000 December - President Gbagbo‟s Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) emerges as the biggest single party in 
parliamentary elections.  
  
2001 January - Attempted coup fails.  
  
2001 March - President Gbagbo and opposition leader Ouattara meet for the first time since violence erupted 
between their supporters in October 2000 and agree to work towards reconciliation.  
  
2001 - Reports of a child slave ship off Africa ‟s west coast spark allegations of child slavery in cocoa 
plantations, straining international relations. Government moves to tackle the issue.  
  
2001 March - Calls for fresh presidential and legislative elections after Alassane Ouattara‟s party gains 
majority at local polls.  
  
2001 June - Amnesty International criticises government‟s human rights record over alleged extra-judicial 
killings of 57 northerners during presidential election campaign in October 2000. Eight gendarmes accused 
of the killings are cleared in August.  
  
2001 October - President Gbagbo sets up National Reconciliation Forum. General Guei refuses to attend in 
protest against the arrest of his close aide Captain Fabien Coulibaly.  
  
2001 November - Opposition leader Alassane Ouattara returns, ending year-long exile in France and Gabon.  
  
2002 August - Ouattara‟s RDR opposition party is given four ministerial posts in new government.  
 
Rebellion 
  
2002 19 September - Mutiny in Abidjan by soldiers unhappy at being demobilised grows into full-scale 
rebellion, with Côte d‟Ivoire Patriotic Movement rebels seizing control of the north.  
  
2002 October-December - Short-lived ceasefire in October gives way to further clashes and battle for key 
cocoa-industry town of Daloa. Previously unknown rebel groups seize towns in west.  
  
2003 January - President Gbagbo accepts peace deal at talks in Paris. Deal proposes power-sharing 
government.  
 
Power-sharing  
  
2003 March - Political parties, rebels agree on new government to include nine members from rebel ranks. 
“Consensus” prime minister, Seydou Diarra, tasked with forming cabinet.  
 66 
  
2003 May - Armed forces sign “full” ceasefire with rebel groups to end almost eight months of rebellion.  
  
2003 July - At presidential palace ceremony military chiefs and rebels declare war is over.  
  
2003 August - Group of suspected mercenaries and their backers detained in France; they are said to have 
planned to assassinate President Gbagbo.  
  
2003 September - Rebels accuse President Gbagbo of failing to honour peace agreement and pull out of unity 
government.  
  
2003 December - 19 killed in armed attack on state TV building in Abidjan. Rebels rejoin government of 
national unity.  
 
Hostilities and the road to peace  
  
2004 March - Deadly clashes during crackdown on opposition rally against President Gbagbo in Abidjan. 
The former ruling party, the Côte d‟Ivoire Democratic Party (PDCI), pulls out of the government, accusing 
President Gbagbo of “destabilising the peace process”. First contingent of UN peacekeeping force deployed.  
  
2004 May - UN report says March‟s opposition rally was used as a pretext for a planned operation by 
security forces. Report says more than 120 people were killed and alleges summary executions and torture.  
  
2004 November - Outbreak of hostilities: Ivorian air force attacks rebels. French forces enter the fray after 
nine of their soldiers are killed in an air strike, destroying the Ivorian air force fleet. Violent anti-French 
protests ensue. The UN imposes an arms embargo.  
  
2004 December - Parliament passes key reforms envisaged under 2003 peace accord, including abolishing 
need for president to have Ivorian mother and father (which would allow Ouattara to enter his candidacy in 
an election).  
  
2005 April - Government, rebels declare an “immediate and final end” to hostilities. The move follows talks 
in South Africa. Gbagbo invokes Article 48 of the Constitution to allow Ouattara to contest an election, a 
controversial move since it opens the door to other uses of the Article‟s executive power. 
 
2005 – Nationwide elections due to be held on 30 October were postponed.  Protests took place in Abidjan on 
that day in opposition to Gbagbo‟s continued presidency beyond his mandated five year term.  The African 
Union has granted Gbagbo one year from 31 October to remain as head of state and have urged him to 
appoint a prime minister acceptable to all parties. 
 
(Source for Chronology: Wiess, 2005; BBC) 
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Annex I – Map of the Region 
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Annex III - Liberia Field Visit Report 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Throughout my one-week field visit to Liberia I conducted a number of interviews with 
international actors engaged in the reconstruction process in Liberia.  In one respect, the 
interviews were geared towards understanding key conflict dynamics from a historical 
perspective – to draw out those factors that they believed had, and continued to, feed into 
conflict in Liberia.  In another respect, I wanted to try to get a feeling for the longer term 
prospects for Liberia – what dynamics might contribute to renewed conflict in the country. 
 It must be noted that the purpose of the interviews was not specifically concerned with 
the short term situation in Liberia – I was not concerned so much with the intricacies of the 
United Nations led reconstruction process or the immediate political situation – as my 
focus was somewhat broader.  However, issues regarding the elections and progress 
regarding reconstruction were raised and discussed as, of course, they crucially impact 
upon Liberia‟s longer-term future.  For those who wish to learn more regarding the 
immediate reconstruction problems (and recommended solutions) then they should refer to 
recent International Crisis Group reports which detail such issues.   
 During the week, I interviewed personnel from: the US embassy, the United Nations 
Department of Safety and Security, the United Nations Joint Mission Analysis Centre, the 
International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps, Save the Children, DynCorp, and a number 
of UN peacekeepers. 
 
 
Key Findings 
 
There were a number of key areas that were raised by the majority of interviewees – many 
of which serve to reinforce the key findings of my report: 
 
 ‘Given’ Factors: from my discussions it was evident that a number of factors are 
simply assumed to be crucial to sustained peace in the country.  These issues are those 
key areas that are being targeted by the international presence led by the United 
Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).  These issues boil down to: corruption, security, 
good governance, judicial reform, and economic and social development.  These issues 
will not be expanded on here because (as stated above) the key points can be found in 
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recent ICG reports which document and explore them in great detail.  The point here is 
to note that they were assumed by all the respondents to be of crucial importance.   
 
 Rebel Groups: a number of interviewees with considerable knowledge of the security 
situation throughout the country stated that the command and control of rebel groups 
had been largely dismantled following the UN‟s DDR process and that there exists 
little or no joint structure between commanders and fighters at present.  However, 
despite this positive development, there was a strong feeling that it would not be at all 
difficult for rebel groups to regroup should the situation deteriorate and that this could 
occur very quickly.  They agreed that the „big heads‟ are still around and should they 
decide their interests are not served through legitimate political processes (most former 
senior rebel commanders took up jobs in the transitional government) then they may 
well attempt to incite violence in one form or another.  Linked to this point, some 
respondents pointed to the fact that: a large number of weapons are still circulating in 
the area which rebels would have easy access to; many ex-combatants feel the war is 
not fully over; and the inadequacy of the reintegration process meant that supposedly 
disarmed and demobilised fighters may well take up arms again in the future if they do 
not see their situations improve in the medium term.   
 
 Urban Youth: most respondents felt the key threat to stability came from the large 
numbers of disgruntled urban youths, many of whom are ex-combatants traumatised 
from years of war.  They pointed to the fact that most young people living in Monrovia 
and urban centres were unemployed and uneducated (around 85% illiteracy), with 
many waiting to see how the political situation developed before possibly resorting to 
violence in the future.  Many blamed the inadequate reintegration process (due 
primarily to a lack of funding) and the fact the international community was not doing 
enough to address the problem.  This they felt was leading to a culture of mob violence.  
Also, some felt that this phenomenon meant that young people were being excluded 
from any sense of community or family affiliation, which in itself was hampering the 
effectiveness of programmes targeting such youths (an effective environment for 
programmes is required which is simply not present in the urban slums).  Employment 
in agriculture and education were cited as the key ways of channelling the energies of 
these young people.  However, a sense of pessimism was apparent regarding the 
potential for success of such initiatives given the massive levels of unemployment and 
the lack of funding available.  This, they felt, represented the biggest challenge for the 
international community, because the future of country will depend upon the 
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generation that is just coming to adulthood – an uneducated generation brought up in a 
atmosphere of violence and crime.  In conclusion, many people felt that if violence 
were to emerge from anywhere, it would come from the large concentrations of youths 
to be found primarily in Monrovia.  The threat was seen as more medium to long term 
than immediate. 
 
 Volatility:  a common theme was the extremely volatile situation that exists in Liberia.  
This centred on the notion that things can happen in a flash and it doesn‟t take much 
for violence to take hold and spread – arguments that might have a local or personal 
origin can quickly become problems on a larger, perhaps, national scale.  The violence 
which occurred in Oct/Nov 2004 was cited as evidence of this.  This issue was 
frequently attached to the idea that the only factor preventing the spread of such 
violence still further is the UNMIL presence.  
 
 Borders: almost all respondents felt that insecure borders represented a prime threat to 
the stability of Liberia due to the flow of arms, mercenaries and illegal goods.  The 
prevailing mood on this subject was that it was indeed a massive problem but that it is 
just „a fact‟ of the region and something about which little can be done.  Although, 
some felt more effective border controls and developing legitimate cross border trade 
would be positive developments, they doubted whether these were realistic hopes. 
 
 Ethnic/Class divisions: most interviewees stated that resentment towards two key 
groups, the Americo-Liberians (viewed as exclusive elites who have traditionally had 
exclusive access to power, government and education – the fact that many are 
candidates in the election reveals their continued influence) and the Mandingos (the 
Muslim trading class who are often seen as „foreigners‟ who monopolise trade, remain 
in tight-knit impenetrable social groups and who „want it all‟) represented potential 
sources of instability, particularly with regard to the elections and their outcome.  Most 
interviewees agreed that these resentments were not enough to incite conflict but they 
believed that if violence broke out these ethnic/class divisions would perhaps gain 
more importance. 
 
 Regional Instability: a number of interviewees stressed the importance of the potential 
that regional conflict may well derail the peaceful reconstruction of Liberia.  The 
feeling was that, on top of Liberia‟s own problems, the renewal of conflict in 
neighbouring countries would almost undoubtedly destabilise Liberia.  Many fear that 
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if the situation in Cote d‟Ivoire deteriorates, the consequences for Liberia could be 
devastating.  Although, direct reasons for this were vague, interviewees referred to the 
destabilising impact of huge flows of refugees, fighters using Liberia for sanctuary and 
the prospect of many Liberians going to fight across the border (who will constitute a 
source of trouble upon their return to Liberia).   
 
 Elections: most people felt that the elections would take place peacefully (with some 
people believing small scale violence might occur in places but the UN could contain 
it).  A significant worry relates to the urban youths who support George Weah; as noted 
above, many people felt the urban youths represented the most likely group who could 
instigate violence and thus the fear persists that, should George Weah lose the 
elections, his supporters may well react violently (interviewees disagreed over the 
capacity of the UN to contain such violence).  However, most interviewees feel the real 
cause for concern will come a number of months down the line when people have a 
clearer idea of how the political situation will affect them (a „wait and see‟ mentality) – 
if large numbers feel they remain excluded from the state then the potential for violent 
reaction against the new government is high.  Respondents could not place any specific 
time frame on this (as it is of course just speculation) but stated that it is something that 
should be monitored closely because, as the history of the region has shown, poor 
governance has been a primary cause of conflict; if the new government fails to deliver 
basic services and noticeable progress then this might provide the motivation for large 
numbers to resort to violence.  
 
 False sense of security: Linked to a number of the points above, a common feeling 
among those interviewed was that the UN presence, combined with the „wait and see‟ 
mentality surrounding the elections, is creating a false sense of security in Liberia.  The 
prevailing view was that conflict in the short term is very unlikely because of these two 
factors.  When asked about the potential for conflict in the future, answers were usually 
preceded by a despondent look and a shrug of the shoulders.  The basis for such 
pessimism lay in the fact that interviewees generally believed that unless substantial 
progress is made in key areas (governance, corruption, etc) before the UN pulls out 
then the prospects for peace in the long term are grim.  
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Prospects for the future – ‘the flames of war’ 
 
As has been shown in the main body of the report, conflict emerges when a number of key 
factors converge.  In order to explain and simplify the potential for conflict in Liberia it is 
helpful to use the analogy of a fire.  In this analogy fire represents conflict.  Logs represent 
the underlying causes of conflict which form the basis for the fire.  The kindling represents 
the factors that facilitate conflict.  The match represents the sparks that can cause the 
kindling to ignite.  Petrol represents conflict intensification factors which when added to 
the fire cause it to ignite much quicker and subsequently burn with greater intensity.  Fire 
depends upon oxygen to burn, even if all the above elements of conflict are present, if one 
can keep them in a vacuum then conflict will not ignite – this represents those factors 
which prevent conflict. 
 
 Logs (causal factors): without doubt, many of the primary factors which have caused 
conflict in the region in the past are still present in Liberia: corruption is endemic from 
the local level through to government; extreme poverty and unemployment are 
widespread; the transitional government has not been able to ensure the effective 
control of the country‟s natural resources; and large sections of society continue to feel 
alienated, not only from the state but from community and family structures, not least 
young people who not only still remain crucially excluded from society but, also, have 
known little other than war during their lives.  All these factors combine to create an 
underlying base of resentment, exclusion and tension.  Such grievances established the 
foundations for conflict in the past and it is fair to assume those same grievances exist 
today.  It remains to be seen whether a new government will effectively address all 
these deep-seated causal factors.  However, it is safe to assume that in the short to 
medium term at least, these crucial issues will remain largely unresolved.   
 
 Kindling (facilitating factors): there are a number of factors that are required to 
facilitate the onset of conflict.  Any insurgency or rebel group requires a social base 
from which the ranks of the force are drawn.  As stated above, in Liberia there are 
many disgruntled and disaffected youths and former ex-combatants, many of whom 
would hardly hesitate to take up arms again.  For many, the war may offer the prospect 
of escape from the desperate situations in which they find themselves.  It is likely that 
many such potential raw recruits for rebellion will be present in Liberia for some time 
to come.  Even if the raw recruits exist, insurgencies require leaders with charisma, 
access to wealth and the ability to command respect.  As mentioned above, it would 
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take very little for former rebel commanders to reorganise former fighting forces or 
rebel groups (this is most likely to occur if they feel excluded from political power or 
influence).  One must remember that LURD was essentially a reformulation of the 
ULIMO rebel group which had supposedly formally ceased to exist following the 1997 
disarmament programme, the members of which felt excluded from the Taylor 
government.  The history of the region has shown that there has been a plentiful supply 
of would-be commanders spurred on by the prospect of both economic gain and 
political power.  Another facilitating factor is that of porous borders which allows the 
flow of arms through illicit cross-border trading.  Rebellions need weapons with which 
to fight.  The cross-border shadow economies that continue to function in the region, 
due largely to uncontrolled borders, means that potential rebels will have access to 
weapons should they require.  Also, porous borders allows the influx of regional 
mercenaries who, as we have seen in the main report, depend upon conflict to survive.  
All these factors exist which could perceivably facilitate conflict in Liberia.    
 
 The match (sparks): a number of potential sparks for conflict exist in Liberia that 
could potentially ignite the kindling and logs outlined above.  As was made clear to me 
during my field visit, it does not take much for violence to spread rapidly.  Small 
incidents can trigger disproportionately large reactions amongst populations when 
angers, resentments and grievances are strained.  Also, the history of the region has 
shown that it only takes small numbers of rebels to instigate conflicts that lasted for 
years.  Taylor‟s initial incursion into northern Liberia in 1989 consisted of only around 
150 rebels.  So, conflict could emerge from a similar small-scale rebel incursion.  The 
elections of course represent a primary potential spark for violence, however, as made 
clear above, this is more likely to come in the aftermath of elections rather than during 
them.  Ethnically or politically inspired killings or political assassinations may also 
provide the spark for conflict.  Another spark could come from regional instability such 
as the sudden influx of refugees as a result of conflict in a neighbouring country.  
Essentially, the point here is that many potential sparks for renewed violence and 
conflict exist in Liberia due primarily to continued internal and external instability.   
 
 Petrol (conflict intensification factors): there are a number of factors that exist which 
serve to make conflict more likely and which would ensure its spread if the fire were to 
ignite.  Perhaps the most important of these is that of ethnic and class divisions such as 
the Americo-Liberian/indigenous Liberian divide and the widespread animosity shown 
towards Mandingo Liberians.  Whilst these factors may not be sufficient to cause 
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conflict alone, as has been shown in the past, these differences can serve as rationales 
for those trying to explain their exclusion.  Petrol may also be supplied by regional 
states or exiled warlords (the obvious example being Charles Taylor) with an interest in 
promoting instability in Liberia – such regional actors may for example supply arms to 
rebel groups or provide them with sanctuary.   
 
 Oxygen supply (factors preventing conflict): whilst it has been shown that many of 
the elements required to build the fire are present (or potentially present) in Liberia, 
there are a number of factors preventing the flames of war from igniting; those factors 
that are keeping Liberia in a vacuum, deprived of oxygen for the time being.  First and 
foremost, is the provision of security, which is currently being overseen by the massive 
United Nations presence – with 15,000 peacekeepers on the ground there is little 
possibility violence will be allowed to spread out of control.  However, the UN will 
soon begin to withdraw and the Liberian government will have to be able to ensure that 
the security sector is sufficiently equipped to ensure security can be maintained.  
Second, currently there exists an atmosphere of „wait and see‟ – people are waiting to 
see whether the new government will prove any better than what has gone before.  
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 To stay with the analogy, conflict may emerge when all the elements required to make 
the fire burn are present.  If one or more of these elements is not present then we can 
assume that conflict will not occur.  I would argue that in the short-term the potential for 
conflict is low because the oxygen supply has been effectively cut off by the massive 
international presence and people are either waiting to see the final outcome of the 
elections or are willing to wait and judge the new government‟s performance after it is 
formed.  Thus, even though the fire is laid and the logs and kindling are undoubtedly 
present, in the short-term, the most we can expect is for the odd spark to cause brief and 
small-scale conflagrations but which are soon starved of oxygen and extinguished. 
 In the medium-term to long-term the potential for conflict is much greater.  The key 
question here is whether enough can be done to remove the logs (the underlying causes of 
conflict) before the oxygen is allowed back in (when the UN begins to withdraw and 
people increasingly demand results from the new government).  Efforts to remove the logs 
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are underway and what needs to be done in this respect has been clearly documented by the 
ICG: for example, wiping out corruption, developing the capacity of civil society to ensure 
governmental transparency, strengthening the rule of law through judicial reform, 
promoting community level economic development, strengthening infrastructure etc.  All 
the efforts of the international community are vital in this respect.  Tackling the underlying 
cause of conflict is, in the long term, the most important factor that will ensure conflict 
does not break out again.  If the logs can be removed, the kindling might still ignite but it 
will burn down quickly and be containable.   
 Additionally, during this crucial transition period, initiatives must also be targeted at the 
kindling (facilitating factors) such as effective reintegration programmes for ex-combatants 
and attempts to secure Liberia‟s borders 
 Removing the logs and kindling are unfortunately processes that take much time.  
Therefore every effort has to be made to ensure security can be maintained whilst these 
processes take place.  It is a simple fact that the UN will one day withdraw its 
peacekeepers entirely.  It simply does not have the resources or political will to remain in 
Liberia indefinitely.  After the elections, an exit strategy will be implemented that will 
culminate with its eventual complete withdrawal.  Thus, the responsibility for security 
must gradually be handed over to indigenous forces.  However, the slow pace of Liberia‟s 
security sector reform suggests that Liberia‟s new police force and army will not be able to 
effectively prevent the flow of oxygen for some time to come.  This represents the window 
in which conflict may emerge – a period when the key elements necessary for conflict still 
exist whilst the capacity to contain violence is weak.  
 Of course, it is extremely difficult to predict how the situation will develop in the long-
term.  From a pessimistic viewpoint, it is reasonable to suggest that the underlying causes 
and facilitating factors of conflict, outlined above, will still be present to some extent after 
the UN peacekeepers have withdrawn.  In such a context we might well reach the 
conclusion that the potential for conflict will be high.  Those elements of conflict that make 
up the fire may well come together, fuelled by enough oxygen, which will allow the flames 
to spread.  If substantial and meaningful progress has not been made before the UN 
peacekeepers draw down then the international community must be prepared for renewed 
conflict and the humanitarian consequences that entails.  In this sense, very close and 
careful monitoring of the transition period will be required, particularly with respect to the 
effectiveness of the new government.  The key point here is that the current period of 
relative calm should not be allowed to breed complacency: the potential for conflict 
remains very real, even if we do not reach the fatalistic conclusion that there will be 
renewed conflict.   In this sense, the coming months and years are crucial for Liberia‟s 
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future development and stability.  Rapid progress needs to be made in a number of key 
areas to ensure that renewed conflict does not wash away all hope for Liberia.  All efforts 
must be directed towards supporting the new government in this task so that sufficient and 
noticeable progress is made before the peacekeepers leave.  It is a very fine balance, but 
success is possible. 
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Annex IV – Conflict Chart 
